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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GLEN C. WEISER, an individual,
Plaintiff,
v.

[revised]
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER AND JUDGMENT

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

Civil No. 910749302PR.
Hon. Rodney S. Paije

The Court having considered the various proceedings previously conducted by the Court
and the Court's prior rulings in the case and having further considered that all issues before the
IOI
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Court have been heretofore resolved or adjudicated, the Court hereby makes its findings of fact7
conclusions of law and order and judgment as follows:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1.

This long enduring case arises from an aciion that was filed by Glen C. VYciser

(hereinafter the "Plaintiff* or "Weiser") against defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company
(hereinafter "Union Pacific" or "Railroad") regarding a parcel of land located in Davis County,
Utah near the Salt Lake County line (hereinafter the "Property").
2.

A brief history of the case is given by the Supreme Court in Weiser v. Union

Pacific R. Co., 932 P.2d 596 (Utah 1997)» which provides, in part, as follows, "In 1873,
Wciser's most remote predecessor in interest purportedly received title to the disputed land
through a federal land grant patent issued by President Ulysses S. Grant. In 1935, the district
court for Davis County quieted title to the disputed property in Roelof Steenblik, one of Wetser's
predecessors in interest. All known entities with a possible claim to the property were made
parties to that action. The Railroad was not made a party because there was no public record of
• its interest. The Railroad did receive constructive notice by publication, however," Id. at 597,
3.

" In 1982, Union Pacific began construction of a semi-truck loading facility on the

disputed property, in 1987, Weiser discovered die Railroad's use of the property and through
counsel requested the Railroad to surrender and vacate the property. The Railroad refused, and
Weiser bad Associated Title Company prepare a title report, which showed that Weiser owned
the property in fee simple. He again made a formal demand diat the Railroad surrender and

2
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vacate the property. Union Pacific again refused. Plaintiff brought this action to gain possession
of and to quiet title to the property/' Id. ai 597.
4.

Union Pacific defended the action "contending that the United Stales had granted

its predecessor in interest^ Utah Central Railroad, a 40(Wbot-wide "right-of-way through public
lands for the construction of a railroad and telegraph" in March of 1870, One of the conditions
of the grant was that within three months after the passage of the 1870 Act, the Railroad file with
the Secretary of Interior a map approved by him "exhibiting the line of said company, as the
same has been located and constructed/* The parties dispute whether this condition was fulfilled,
Weiser contends that because the Railroad did not timely file a certified map that was accepted
by the Secretary of Interior, the Railroad's grant of right-of-way fails, [footnote omitted]. Afler
extensive research and historical analysis, the trial court granted a partial summary judgment that
the grant to the Railroad failed for lack of condition/* Id. at 597.
5.

Through extensive summary judgment proceedings, the Court detenmined that the

following facts relating to the parties* controversy were undisputed,
(a) The Act of Congress of December 15,1870 (16 Stat. 395) (hereinafter "1870 Act"),
which is relevant in this matter, provides among other things as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, that the right of way through the public lands be, and
the same is hereby, granted to the Utah Central Railroad Company, a corporation created
under the laws of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah, its successors and
assigns, for the construction of a railroad and telegraph from a point at or near Ogden
City, in the territory of Utah, to Salt Lake City, in said territory;... Said way is granted to
said railroad to the extent of 200 feet in width on each side of said railroad where it may
pass through the public domain ... Providcd> lhat within three months from the passage
of this act the said Utah Central Railroad Company shall file with the Secretary of the

3
nn9Qnc;

FEB-07-2008 THU 12:12 PM

W DISTRICT COURT

FAX NU

144 WISH i

r.

U4/ i i

Interior a map approved by him, exhibiting the line of the railroad ofsach company as
the same has been located and constructed: .,,

Z
5T

M

16 Stat. 395 (December 15, 1870).
(b) The conditional 200 foot right of way grant pursuant to the 1870 Act would overlap
substantially all of plaintiffs property (hereinafter "Property") which is the subject of this action.
(c)

On March 7,1871, a profile map wasfiledwith the office of the Secretary of the

Interior by the Utah Central Railroad. Defendant Union Pacific Railroad is a successor in
interest to the Utah Central Railroad.
(d)

On the following day, the map was rejected by the Secretary of the Interior and

returned to the Utah Central Railroad on grounds that il was not certified.
(e)

On March 30,1871, the Utah Central Railroad resubmitted die profile map

(presumably a certified map) which was duly accepted by the Secretary of the Interior on that
date.
(f)

The Utah Central Railroad failed to file a certified map with the Secretary of the

Interior within the time limitation set by Congress in the 1B70 Act.
(g)

In exchange for consideration, plaintiffs predecessors in interest received title to

the Property by patent from the United States Government on September 25, 187[3) [sic],
0)

Plaintiffs chain of title in the Property appears on the record of the Davis County

Recorder in which county the Property is situated(k)

A right-of-way grant to the Utah Central Railroad, which is at issue in this case,

does not appear on any of the plat maps recorded in the Davis County Recorder's Office.

4
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PlaintiTf and his predecessors in interest have paid the property taxes on the

Properly for at least the pasL 25 years.
(m)

Defendant made its First improvements and enclosures on the Property when it

commenced the construction of the TOFC facility in 1982.
(n)

There is a disputed question of fact whether defendant Union Pacific Railroad

and/or its predecessor's have paid property taxes on the property,
6. The Court granted Weiser7s motion for partial summary judgment pertaining to
tho land grant issue in 1995, The Railroad filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was
denied. Thereafter, an appeal was pursued by the Railroad which was later dismissed by the
Supreme Court. On October 19, 2000, the Railroad filed a motion for reconsideration. Weiser
objected to the motion as untimely and improper. The Court determined that it would consider
the motion,
7. Upon considering the Railroad's motion, the Court determined that despite its
prior granting of partial summaiy judgment in favor of Weiser, the doctrine of stare decisis
required the Court to alter its prior ruling in the case.1 The Court concluded that it was
compelled under the doctrine of stare decisis to change its decision despite the fact that the
undisputed facts reflected that the Utah Central Railroad had failed to comply with the
Conditional Grant. In making its decision the Court acknowledged that Weiser was not a party
to any of the decisions cited by the Court and was not afforded an opportunity to present
evidence or raise issues in those cases.

5
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The Court rejected Weiser's arguments that the Court should have analyzed the

5

issues in the case under the doctrines ofres judicata and collateral estoppel and that neither

g

doctrine was binding upon Weiser in this case. Based upon the Court's legal reasoning, the

ji

Court reversed its prior summary judgment made in favor of Weiser and granted the Railroad's
motion for partial summary judgment in its October 1, 2001 ruling,
9,

Based upon the Courts' amended ruling that the Conditional Grant was valid, the

Court addressed the character of the Grant. The Grant provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That the right of way through the public lands be, and the same is
hereby> granted to the Utah Central Railroad Company, a corporation created under the
laws of the legislative assembly of the Territory of Utah, its successors and assigns, for
the construction of a railroad and telegraph from a point at or near Ogden City, in the
Territory of Utah, to Salt Lake City, in said Territory; and the right, power, and authority
is hereby given to said corporation to take from the public lands adjacent to the line of
said road material of earth, stone, timber, and so forth, for the construction thereof Said
way is granted to said railroad to the extent of two hundred feet in width on each side of
said railroad where it may pass through the public domain,...
10. The Court then concluded that the foregoing conveyance conveyed a fee or
limited fee interest in the Property to the Railroad and Weiser has no remaining interest in the
Property. The Court rejected Weiser's argument thai the Conditional Grant conveyed only a
right-of-way to the Utah Central Railroad. Consequently, the Court concluded that the subject
Property was owned by the Railroad.2

The Coun also concluded that Weiser lacked standing lo challenge the Grant,
' There was only D small part of ihe Property chat was outside of the 400 foot right-of-way and the parties have
settled any claim thereto.

6
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11. However, the Court concluded that the Property was in fact part of the "public
lands" at the time of the Conditional Grant was approved by Congress. In making the foregoing
determination the Court rejected Weiser's argument that the Property was not taken out of the
public lands because Weiser's original predecessor (Tomlinson) had acquired a homestead or
pre-emption interest in the property, Weiser contended that Tomlinson's interest in the property
was superior to the Railroad's because Tomlinson presented his Declaratory Statement of Preemption on April 17, 1869 before the Conditional Grant was approved by Congress and therefore
the Property was not pan of the "public lands*' at die time Congress approved the Conditional
Grant. Weiser contended that his position was supported by case authority. The Court rejected
Weiser's arguments and concluded that the period of time for perfecting an interest in Property
through the doctrine of pre-emption is determined by the date that the final proof of pre-emption
was completed on July 6, 1872 and not on April 17, 1869 when Tornlinson's Declaratory
Statement of Pre-emption was made. Because the Court concluded that the date of proof is the
controlling date for the purpose of determining when whether the Property was part of the public
lands, the Court determined that the evidence proffered by Weiser at an evidentiary hearing that
Tomlinson Declaration Statement was made on the public record on April 17, 1869 (before the
Conditional Grant was approved by Congress) was irrelevant12. The Court also concluded that the Decree Quieting Title made in favor of
Weiser's predecessor by the Fourth District Court is not dispositive or binding upon this Court's
determination that the Property belongs to the Railroad because no action under state law has the
abilily to limit or circumscribe land rights granted to the Railroad. In making this determination

7
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the Court rejected Weiser's argument thai the Decree Quieting Title to the Property made by the
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honorable Judge Pratt in 1935 is binding and enforceable under the doctrines of res judicata and

a

collateral estoppel because the Railroad had no interest of record in the County Recorder and

*3

because the Railroad received constructive notice of the quiet title action by means of publication.
13. The Court has also concluded thai the conveyance of its interest in the Property to
another did not cause the Property to revert to Weiser. The Court also rejected the argument
raised by Weiser that defendant Union Pacific intended to remise or release its interest in the
Property when it quitclaimed its interest in the Property to another and rejects the assertion that
the conveyance of its interest by quitclaim deed was conclusive evidence. Weiser contended that
if the conveyance of the Property was a limited fee conveyance, the limited fee was made subject
to reverter to the United States and thereafter passed to Weiser through his chain of title
stemming back to the original land patent given to Tomlinson.
14. The Court has determined that the Railroad did not obtain any interest in the
Property by way of adverse possession because it did not satisfy the requirements needed to
establish a claim of adverse possession and that its ownership interest in the Property is based
solely upon the Conditional Grant
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions made by the Court and the prior
proceedings in the case, the Court makes and enters its order and judgment as follows:
ORDERED that defendant Union Pacific Railroad received a limited fee interest in the
Property pursuant to the Conditional Grant;
8
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ORDERED that defendant Union Pacific Railroad's limited fee did not revert back to the
United States and then transfer fonvard to Weiser when Union Pacific Railroad purported to
convey its purported interest to another;
J

i

ORDERED that Weiser's claims for relief as alleged in his complaint including his

4

claims to quiet title, restitution, forcible detainer, treble damages, trespass and unjust enrichment
are hereby dismissed with prejudice;
ORDERED that defendani Union Pacific Railroad's alleged defense of adverse
possession is also dismissed for cause; and
ORDERED that this Judgment is final as to the matters ruled upon and shall be entered
by the Clerk of the Court without further delay, the Court having determined that all claims
between the parties in this case have now been adjudicated.
DATED this a l ^ d a y o f ' ' T ^ r - ^ ^ W r

2007.

BY THE COURT:

HON. R O D l ^ S.PAGE
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and con'ect copy of the foregoing was sent via first class mail

*i

by depositing the same with the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid to:
JeffDevashrayee
2S0 South 400 West, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Facsimile No. 212-3978

P403D4
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CERTIFICATE OP MAILING
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I hereby certify (hat a true and correct copy of the foregoing [revised] proposed findings

N
H

of fact, conclusions of law and judgment and order vvas majled via first class mail on October 9,
2007 by depositing the same with the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid to:
JefFDcvashrayec
280 South 400 West, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84)01
Facsimile No. 212-3978
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FARMINGTON, UTAH
THE COURT:
MS. PECK:

DECEMBER 8, 2005

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
Morning.

THE COURT:

This is the time set for a hearing in the

matter of Glen C. Weiser versus Union Pacific Railroad,
is case number 910749302.

This

Mr. Weiser is not present,

apparently is ill and has not been able to be here today, but
it f s the decision of his counsel and Mr. Wiser to go ahead in
this matter.

Is that correct, Mr. Call?

MR. CALL:

(Unintelligible)

THE COURT:

Mr. call is here representing Mr. Weiser

along with co-counsel.
Mr. Jeffery Devashrayee
MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
THE COURT:

—

The defendant is represented by
—
Yes.

who is representing the Railroad.

Is the

3

plaintiff ready to proceed, Mr. Call?
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:

We are, your Honor.
Is the defendant ready, Mr. Devashrayee?

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
THE COURT:
statements?

Yes, your Honor.

Do either of you wish to make opening

Mr. Call?

MR. CALL:

I believe we } d just proceed with the

testimony at this time and then reserve that statement for
after.
THE COURT:

Is that agreeable with you, Mr. Devashrayee?

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

All right.

You may proceed.

Call your

first witness.
MR. CALL:

Your Honor, the plaintiff, would call Max

Elliott to the stand.
THE COURT:

Mr. Elliott, will you step up and be sworn

please.
If you'll have a seat on the witness stand please.
MAX ELLIOTT,
called as a witness, being first duly sworn,
was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. CALL:
Q.

Good morning, Mr. Elliott.

A.

Good morning.

4

Q.

How are you this morning?

A.

Ifm good.

Q.

Good.

We appreciate you coming today.

Can you state

your full name for the record please.
A.

Max Brent Elliott.

Q.

And what is your currently address, Mr. Elliott?

A.

917 South 250 East, Farmington, Utah.

Q.

And just very briefly, what is your educational

background?
A.

I attended college at Weber College and Brigham Young

University.

Took correspondence courses in surveying.

Q.

And what licenses do you hold?

A.

I hold a license as a licensed land surveyor in the

State Of Utah, licensed —

license number 141269.

Q.

And where are you currently employed?

A.

I'm currently employed by Davis County.

Q.

And how long have you been employed by Davis County?

A.

I've been with Davis County 45 years approximately.

Q.

In what capacity?

A.

To begin with, I just worked with the surveying crew.

Then when I was licensed in '64, I was over the crew. And
then eventually I became the Deputy County Surveyor and now I
am presently the County Surveyor.
Q.

Okay.

Are you acquainted with the method of surveying

and the responsibilities of surveyors in connection with the

5

standards established in the State of Utah?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

Are you acquainted with the method of recording

documents in the Davis County —
A.

I am.

Q.

—

A.

We work —

(Unintelligible)?
in our capacity as the County Surveyor, we

work a lot, as do all surveyors, with the records of the
various courthouses.

Specifically in my case, it would be

the courthouse of Davis County, the Recorder!s Office.
Q.

And in connection with this case, have you had an

opportunity to review the records of the county with respect
to the property that's in dispute which is located in Section
14?
A.

I have.

Q.

Okay.

And what materials have you reviewed in

connection with Section 14?
A.

I reviewed from the patent at the time that the property

was deeded to George Tomlinson, the transactions since then
where he!d deeded it like to Malcolm McDuff, McDuff deeded
back to him.

Then McDuff deeded to Hancocks. All -- all

these deeds I'm very familiar with.
There was a question raised in my mind as to the
relationship of the patent, and understanding a little bit
about preemption —

6

Q.

Okay.

Let me —

let me

A.

Okay.

Q.

I!ll address that.

A.

Okay.

Q.

Okay.

—

Based on the records that you have reviewed and

your experience as a surveyor, do you have an understanding
as to the history of Section 14 located in Davis County?
A.

I do.

Q.

Okay.

Does that information indicate, in your opinion,

where the centerline of the railroad track was located with
respect to the Utah Central Railroad?
A.

From the deeds you can come up with the centerline of

the Union Pacific Railroad, or the Utah Central Railroad
then.
Q.

Okay.

And in connection with your work, have you

prepared a plat or a map of various deeds as they appear on
the records of the county?
A.

I prepared this one from the records of Davis County,

this plat that's here.
Q.

Okay.

And when you say this one, are you referring to

what's been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1?
A.

Yes, 1 am.

Q.

And is that your surveyor's certificate that appears on

that plat?
A.

That is

—

002950
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Q.

(Unintelligible)

A.

That is correct, that is

Q.

Okay.

A.

—

—

my certificate.

MR. CALL:

Your Honor, we'd move for admission of

Exhibit 1.
THE COURT:

Mr. Devashrayee.

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:

Your Honor, the only comment I have is

that it!s not accurate with respect to the Court1s ruling
earlier a couple of times with regard to ownership of that,
of the right of way.

Otherwise, I don!t have any objection

to it.
THE COURT:

Noting that the Court has previously

determined the ownership of the easement, the only issue
before the Court is the question of where the centerline of
the original road lied.

The Court will receive it only as to

that issue.

Relative to the other issues, the Court will not

receive it.

And so it's limited for that purpose, and I will

receive it for that purpose only.
MR. CALL:
Q.

Okay.

(BY MR. CALL)

Mr. Elliott, in looking at Exhibit 1, if

you would for a minute, could you explain to the Court, if
you would, the contents of that exhibit.
A.

We show the dash —

I show the dashed line where the 200

feet would be each side of the centerline of the Utah Central

nnoQci
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Railroad.

I also show the deeds and they —

how they were

conveyed, like to Denver and Rio Grande Railroad, to Mellons
and others, warranty deeds, other deeds that were deeded to
those folks way back in the beginning.
Q.

Okay.

And in looking at these color codes that you have

on this exhibit, do those —

those legends that you have

there correlate with the deeds with respect to each of those
properties?
A.

Yes, that's —

that is the purpose and intent for the

keys over here on the right-hand side.
Q.

Okay.

And with respect to those deeds, is there

information that would indicate in the deeds that you have
reviewed where the centerline is with respect to the Utah
Central Railroad?
A.

Yes, they do.

Q.

Okay.

Would you explain to the Court which deeds you1re

referring to.
A.

Yes.

The second one down where it ! s the Hancock, the

Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, April the
28th, 1884, recorded in Book H, page 570, Davis County
Recorder!s Office, ties it to the north quarter corner and
leaves no doubt as to what itfs doing.

Especially when you

look to the deed which is immediately south of that, which is
a deed from George Tomlinson to Denver and Rio Grande
Railroad, March 22nd, 1883.

In —

in talking about his
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parcel, they describe it as being bounded on the north by
Thomas Hancock, bounded on the south by Thomas Hancock, and
bounded on the east side by the Utah Central Railroad.
Q.

Okay.

A.

Then the description across there, which is the Mellon

description, which is clear over —

right on the top clear to

the right-hand side, says, Thomas Hancock and Sarah Ann
Hancock to Joesph W. Mellon, April the 2nd, 1920, recorded in
Book 1-C, page 519, Davis County Recorder's Office, that is
also tied to the north quarter corner as it comes up there
and describes it.

And there's —

you can determine the

centerline of the railroad, the Central Railroad, from those
two descriptions -Q.

Okay.

A.

—

Q.

And the deeds that you're referring to, are they set

at that point.

forth in Exhibits 33, 34 and 35 of Plaintiff's Exhibit?

Will

you take a minute and look at those?
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

What exhibit numbers are they, Mister

—

33, 34, and 35.

THE WITNESS:

The two that I'm specifically talking

about is 33 is correct.
Q.
A.

(BY MR. CALL)

Okay.

34 is further south down the railroad.

It's —

I

mentioned it, but it's not the one that I'm specifically

rio n o r o
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using at this time.
And letfs see

The other one is the deed to Mellon.

—

Q.

Well, let's just go through them one at a time then

A.

Okay.

Q.

—

A.

Okay.

Q.

—

so with respect to Exhibit No. 34

that.was the —

—

—

one of deeds that you relied upon in

making that determination?
A.

No. 33 was.

Q.

No. 33.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

And is that -- is that deed that's been set out

in Exhibit 33 a true and correct copy of the deed that was
recorded with the County Recorder?
A.

Yeah.

We have the actual deed here as Book H of Deeds,

page 570, which is from the County Recorder's records.
MR. CALL:

Okay.

Your Honor, we'd move for the

admission of Exhibit 33.
THE COURT:

Any objection with the same limitation, Mr.

Devashrayee?
MR. DEVASHRAYEE:

No objection with the same limitation,

your Honor.
THE COURT:
Q.

(BY MR. CALL)

All right.
Okay.

33 will be received.

What was the other deed that you

looked at, Mr. Elliott?

nnooc/i
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A.

The other one is the deed to Mellon, which is on the

east side.

Let me look here and see which one it is.

It's number 36.

That deed is mentioned I think

previously as in Book 1-C of Deeds, page 519.
MR. CALL:

Okay.

Your Honor, we'd move for the

admission of the warranty deed that has been presented as
Plaintiff's Exhibit 36.
THE COURT:

Mr. Devashrayee, with the same

qualification?
MR. DEVASHRAYEE:

Yes, your Honor.

And I —

I probably

won't have any objections with regard to these deeds as long
as we have that qualification, which I think embodies my
concern about relevance (Unintelligible).
THE COURT:

That!s --

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
THE COURT:

Is that fair?

And I!m not gonna have any problem

—

The reason the Court is receiving them is

centerline issue only.
MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

Okay.

Thank you.

Well, your Honor, may I address that briefly?
Sure.
It was my understanding that these

proceedings were not only to determine the centerline, but
also the boundaries of the Weiser property with respect to
the right of way and how much of the property of the Weiser
property lies outside of the 400-foot right of way

—

nnonrc
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THE COURT:

That may be the issue also, but the key is

where that centerline is.
MR. CALL:

Right.

THE COURT:

And

—

There's no question it goes 2 00 feet on each

side of that centerline, and so the question of where the
Weiser property would lie is also relevant, but
MR. CALL:

—

Right.

THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

—

not the chain of title.

But in addition to that, your Honor, these

are public records, they're self-authenticating, and so we

—

when the Court says that there's a limitation, I mean I
understand that there's some relevancy limitation, but these
are authentic

—

THE COURT:

Doesn't matter.

for that issue.

I'm not considering them

The Court's already ruled on that as far as

those things are concerned, and you need to realize that I'm
receiving them for only that purpose.

That's the only reason

they'll be received by the Court and allowed in evidence.
MR. CALL:

Okay.

THE COURT:
MR. CALL:
Q.

Okay?
Thank you, your Honor.

(BY MR. CALL)

Okay.

With —

what other materials did

you consider, Mr. Elliott, in deciding where the centerline
of that Utah Central Railroad track was located?
A.

The other Denver and Rio Grande descriptions that were

nnoftcc
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deeded further south also

—

Q.

Okay.

Which deed was that that you considered?

A.

That was the No. 34, I believe.

Q.

And what was that transfer, Mr. Elliott?

A.

That was Thomas Hancock to Denver and Rio Grande Western

Railroad Company.

Let me look.

It begins at station 144 plus 17, a point

275 feet east of the quarter post between Sections 11 and 14,
Township 1 North, Range 1 West.

And 725 feet south, 3

degrees 15 minutes west along the centerline of said railway.
They1re speaking of the Denver and Rio Grande, but it
lies immediately against the Utah Central Railroad.
MR. CALL:

Okay.

With that, your Honor, we ? d also move

for Exhibit 34.
THE COURT:

34 is received.

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
THE COURT:

What's your objection on that?

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
THE COURT:

Q.

No objection.

All right.

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
THE COURT:

No objection, your Honor.

Subject to the qualification.

Yes.

(BY MR. CALL)

Mr. Elliott, in addition to the deeds that

we've discussed, what other information have you deter

—

have you looked at in determining where the centerline of the
Utah Central Railroad is located with respect to the records
of the county?

rin o O C T
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A.

I have looked at the Louis L. Pomantier deed that he

gave to Utah Central Railroad and —

but it does not tie it

down, it just gives the width of it, saying it f s 50 feet on
each side of the survey line or along the road.
Q.

And which exhibit is that, Mr. Elliott?

A.

That's Deed No. 4, Lewis Pomantier to Utah Central

Railroad, June 17th, 1870.
Q.

And is that reflected on your map?

A.

It is.

Q.

And how is it reflected?

A.

ItTs the yellow area about halfway through the Tomlinson

property (unintelligible) south.
Q.

And does that deed, it is reference the —

does it

reference the centerline of the railroad track?
A.

That's what it —

well, let's read it.

it was from —

what it called for

—

That probably is better than me trying

to explain it.
Book B of Deeds, page 170, Louis L. Pomantier to Utah
Central Railroad Company, know all men by these presents that
I, Louis D. (sic) Pomantier of Salt Lake City of the County
of Salt Lake and Territory of Utah, in consideration of the
sum of one dollar in hand paid by the Utah Central Railroad
Company of Utah Territory, have bargained and sold and do
hereby grant, bargain, sell, and convey under the said
railroad company, their successors in office and assigns

nnnnco
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forever a certain tract of land, situated, lying, and being
in the County of Davis, in territory aforesaid, bounded and
described as follows, to wit:

All that portion of land

situated in the south half of the northeast quarter of
Section 14, Township 1 North, Range 1 West, U.S. Survey, Salt
Lake Meridian.

Within lines running parallel with the line

of survey of said railroad as now located on each side of the
line of said road at a distance of 50 feet therefrom.

A

certified map of said road is now located, being recorded in
the Recorder's Office of said county.
Do you want me to go or stop

—

thatfs fine.

Q.

No, that —

A.

That pretty well covers what we're talking about, the

centerline.
Q.

We T d move, your Honor —

well, let me first ask,

Mr. Elliott, is Exhibit 4 a true and correct copy of the deed
that was recorded with the County Recorder?
A.

It is.
MR. CALL:

We'd move for admission of Exhibit 4.

THE COURT:

Any objection?

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
THE COURT:
Q.

(BY MR. CALL)

No objection subject to qualification.

4 is received with that limitation.
Based on the various records that you

reviewed, Mr. Elliott, do you have an opinion as to where the
centerline track was of the Utah Central Railroad?
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A.

Absolutely.

Cen —

From the deed from Hancock to the Utah

or to Denver and Rio Grande Railroad and Thomas

Hancock to the Mellons, yeah, that defines it well.
Q.

In addition to these deeds, have you also reviewed other

maps and materials that are located within the County
Recorder r s Office?
A.

I have over the years, yes.

Q.

And what is your opinion as to the location of that

centerline, Mr. Elliott?
A.

Well, I think these two deeds reflect basically where

that 100 foot is between the two deeds, and the centerline
would be 50 feet from either one of them.
Q.

Okay.

And so is that centerline reflected where the

track is located on your Exhibit No. 1?
A.

As per the records, yes.

Q.

Okay.

A.

I have not —

survey.
Q.

I have not conducted an actual field

This is strictly from the records.

Right.

Have you reviewed field surveys that have been

done of the property, however?
A.

Only those —

I!ve looked at them briefly —

that have

been done.
Q.

Now, I believe you mentioned, Mr. Elliott, that —

and

let me ask you, with respect to the records of the county, is
it your understanding —

you1re familiar with the dispute in

nnoQAO
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this case; is that correct?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

And you're familiar with the right of way issue that's

been in dispute in this case?
A.

I am.

Q.

Okay.

And as the County Surveyor, are you familiar with

the records that exist with respect to those properties that
are adjacent to the railroad?
A.

You mean the patents where Utah Central Railroad went

through the properties
Q.

Yes.

A.

—

Q.

Okay.

—

in Davis County?

Yes, very much so.

And are you familiar with which properties were

public lands at the time that the railroad received its
conveyance from the United States in December of 1870?
MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

Objection, your Honor, irrelevant.

Sustained.
Well, your Honor, can I address that issue?
You can.
Your Honor, based on this Court's prior

ruling, this court, it's our understanding, determined that
the light of way grant that was given to the Union Pacific
Railroad was in fact a valid grant, and we're assuming that
to be true.

That grant, however, was made subject to the

condition that it was only over the public lands.

Mr.

nnonc1
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Elliott, who is here, will testify if permitted that in fact,
the Weiser property was not public land at the time that the
right of way was given.

We are not here seeking to challenge

this Court's decision on the validity of that grant.

That we

understand and we respect the Court's decision that that has
been —

that has been decided.

The issue which hasn't been

decided, however, is whether or not these are in fact public
lands.

And in order for Mr. Weiser to be able to fairly

present to this Court the proper boundaries of that right of
way as set forth on the public records, is for Mr. Elliott to
be able to testify as to whether or not this property was
public land at the time that grant was given.

This case,

your Honor, has gone on for many, many years, and this is the
first evidentiary hearing that has ever been held in this
matter.

We don't think that the Court has ever received any

evidence or affidavit with respect to whether this property
is public land or wasn't public land at the time the
conveyance was made.

Mr. Elliott is very familiar with the

events that occurred at the time of the recording of the
right of way or at the time that that grant was given, and we
think it's extremely relevant in order to determine the
boundaries of that right of way, which is the purpose of this
hearing, that he be permitted to testify whether —

whether

part of this property was public land at the time that that
railroad right of way was —

the profile map with respect to

nnonc o
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that right of way was recorded.
THE COURT:

Mr. Devashrayee.

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:

Whether this is public land or private

land has absolutely nothing to do with what we're here for
today.

And the fact is, the Court has already ruled —

let

me read from the Court's ruling which the Court is already
familiar with.

The court determined that the patent for the

(unintelligible) George Tomlinson was included in the right
of way granted the railroad and was a nullity.

The reason

being that the land which is part of the 1870 grant to the
railroad was taken out of the public land subject to
preemption and sale and, therefore, the Land Department was
without authority to convey any rights therein.
That is —

that!s the Court's ruling and that is a

correct ruling, it's consistent with the law, and it has

—

whether this land's public or private land has absolutely
nothing to do with finding the centerline in the 400-foot
grant of right of way, which has been confirmed as being
valid and effective.
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:

(Unintelligible)
May I respond, your Honor?
No.

Based upon the evidence presented to

the Court at the time its ruling was made, the Court has
ruled on this issue and I will sustain the objection, period.
MR. CALL:

Okay.

With that, your Honor, may we —

may
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we at least for purposes of the record
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

You can proffer
—

THE COURT:
MR. CALL:
your Honor.

—

—

make a proffer with Mr. Elliott now?

You may.
Because we don ! t want to have to come back,

We just think that Mr. Elliott has gone through

this in great detail, and if we could go through and put this
evidence on the record, then it would be there for further
review.
THE COURT:
respect.

If11 allow you to proffer it in that

Mr. Devashrayee.

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
to the proffer then?
THE COURT:

Your Honor, do I just sit and listen
I —

you have my objections.

You can listen to the proffer noting that it

comes in only for the purposes of the record.

The Court has

sustained your objection and I will not consider it in my
ruling.
MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
Q.

(BY MR. CALL)

your testimony —

Thank you, your Honor.

Okay.

Mr. Elliott, in connection with

with your review of the records, we were

discussing the public record that -- the records of the
county and what constituted public land in 1870.

Are you

with me?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

You previously testified I believe that you were
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familiar with the various records and deeds as they existed
in Section 14.
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you've reviewed them with respect to the status of

those deeds in 1870; is that correct?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

And do the records of the county reflect that the Weiser

property or even the Tomlinson property, as referred to on
your Exhibit 1, does it reflect that that was public land in
1870?
A.

No, it doesn't reflect either.

Q.

Is it -- from the records of the county that you have

reviewed, does it indicate that there was some claim or
preemption made on the Tomlinson land prior to 1870?
A.

Do I have latitude to speak?

Q.

Yes.

Yes, and let me just —

in talking about the

Tomlinson property, it's my understanding that it's defined
by the outer brackets
A.

The Tom —

—

the Tomlinson property includes this plus the

northeast quarter of the northwest quarter of Section 14 and
lot 2 that sits down below here.
Q.

Okay.

A.

A total of 150.50 acres.

We're looking at 80 acres of

the 150.50 acres.
Q.

Okay.

And in 1870, however, the Weiser property was

nnnftec
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part of that Tomlinson property; is that correct?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

Okay.

And would you for the benefit of the Court in

connection with this proffer indicate what records reflect as
to your opinion that this was not public land in 1870?
And let me just maybe help you through this and ask
you

—

A.

Okay.

Q.

—

could you explain to the Court

—

Well, let me just indicate, I f m not gonna

THE COURT:

let you lead him through a bunch of things, Counsel
MR. CALL:

—

Okay.

THE COURT:

—

if he wants to —

your questions, that's fine, but
THE WITNESS:

if he can respond to

—

Let me say this:

I'm familiar with Utah

Central Railroad all the way through Davis County.
Q.

(BY MR. CALL)

Okay.

A.

As they go through Davis County

Q.

Yeah.

A.

—

—

in most instances, they acquired, Utah Central

Railroad, from the settlers a hundred-foot right of way, 50
feet each side of the road or survey line they described it.
Q.

Okay.

A.

The majority of the property that they went through had

not received their patent by December the 15th, 1870.
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Q.

Okay,

And why is that?

A.

Because there's a process that you have to go through to

get your patent.

The patent isnTt the beginning, it's the

conclusion of the law of 1841, that you have to make a
declaratory statement, then either be on the ground or go on
the ground.
be —

You had to be a citizen of the United States or

or make application to become a citizen of the United

States.

You had to also not have more than one preemption.

You had to be the head of a home or of age or you could be a
woman and still have been eligible to do those things under
that law.

Also, you had to then prove to the United States

of America that you had been on the land, that you met all
these commitments, and then pay them.
you had to pay $1.25 an acre.

If it was 160 acres,

If it was less than 160 acres,

you had to pay $2.50 an acre for that land.
Q.

And in this case, did Mr. Tomlinson, who is the —

do

the records reflect that Mr. Tomlinson was the first claimant
to this property?
A.

Yes, he ! s the —

he ! s the one that got the patent.

Q.

Do the records of the county reflect that Mr. Tomlinson

made a declaratory statement with respect to this property?
A.

No, they do not.

Q.

Okay.

A.

But the National Archives, U.S. Land Office, kept all

that kind of information.

They've done a beautiful job.
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Q.

And have you reviewed those records?

A.

I have.

Q.

And do those records reflect that Mr. Tomlinson made a

declaratory statement that was recorded on April 17th, 1869?
A.

They do.

Q.

Do the records further reflect that there were other

competing declaratory statements made on that property?
A.

In the same year, there was a Mr. Pomantier, Louis L.

Pomantier, the same one that gave the deed to Utah Central
Railroad, he made a declaratory statement.

And also a Mr.

Sabine, a Mr. McDuff, and also a Mr. Varley.
Q.

Okay.

And so when you refer to the one that gave the

Central Railroad a deed, Mr. Pomantier

—

Just if I might approach, your Honor.
Mr. Pomantier who deeded this property to Utah Central
Railroad, referring to the yellow property here?
A.

Yes.

Q.

He gave a deed to the Utah Central Railroad for that

property?
A.

He did, found in Book B, page 170 of the Davis County

Recorder's Office.
Q.

Okay.

And he had made a preemptive claim in 1869 as

well?
A.

Yes.

He made his declaratory statement, No. 631 or 681,

itfs hard to read, for the lot 3 in the southwest quarter of
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the northeast quarter of 14, 1 North, 1 West, Louis L.
Pomantier, May the 22nd, '69.
Q.

Okay.

And would you —

could I refer you to Plaintiff's

Exhibit 8.
A.

Now, which one's this?

Q.

Exhibit 8.

A.

8?

Q.

Could you explain to the Court what that record reflects

Okay.

Yes.

or what the relevancy of that is with respect to these
statements of preemption?
A.

This is No. 742, cash entry, Salt Lake City, Utah

Territory, Section 14, 1 North, 1 West, patent September the
25th, 1873, declaratory statement.

And at that point —

and

this comes from the National Archives.
Q.

Okay.

A.

That point, they go through and they say that —

they

mention George Tomlinson, April 17th, '69, made his
declaratory statement, his first declaratory statement.
Declaratory statement.
conflicts with —

And then after that, they said, it

and they give No. 631 or 681, which is

Louis L. Pomantier, and it looks like a J —

you can't make

out the rest of his name -- Sabine, and he made his April
23rd, '69.

And then there's a couple others.

But it

mentions all these that have made statements in '69 that
they're gonna go onto that ground and prove it, become
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their1s.
Q.

And why were these statements made in 1869?

A.

As Ifve looked through some of the records, it appears

to me that in 1869 is when they finally opened the office in
the Utah Territory in Salt Lake City.
that date.
Q.

I remember reading

I

Is there information or is there —

are there —

is

there information in the public records that you f ve referred
to that indicates when Mr. Tomlinson entered on the property
that you've designated as —
A.

Yes.

Number —

Q.

Well, go ahead.

A.

No. 6 of the exhibits.

Q.

Yes.

A.

A neighbor —

on your map?

let's see

—

|
here!s what it says:

I, Thomas Hancock, a

citizen of the United States and of lawful age, do solemnly
swear that I am well acquainted with George Tomlinson, who is
a naturalized citizen of the United States, and the head of a
family consisting of a wife and one child, and is an
inhabitant of the northeast —

of the northwest quarter and

lot 2 and west half of northeast quarter Section 14 of
Township 1 North, Range 1 West.

And that no other person

resided upon the said land entitled to the right of
preemption.

That the said George Tomlinson entered upon and

made a settlement in person on the said land since the 1st
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day of June., since —

not on, but since the 1st day of June,

1840 •
The reason they say that is prior to 1840, there were
squatters on the ground and they weren't protected by this
part icular preemption law.
Q.

Okay.

A.

Okay.

Q.

—

Let me —

let me ask you another question

—

In order to comply with the preemption

Mr. Elli ott.

statute, was Mr. Tomlinson required to file a declaration?

I

believe you mentioned he was required to file a declaration
of citizens hip.
A.

Yeah.

Q.

And dc the records reflect that Mr. Tomlinson filed a

Yes, he was.

declarationL of citizenship?
A.

No. 2 —

Q.

Exhibi t No. 2

A.

Yeah, No. 2 , declaration of intention to become a

—

citizen of the United -Q.

Will you si ow down, just —

A.

Okay.

Q.

Would you i dentify Exhibit No. 2 for the Court please.

A.

Exhibit No. 2 here is the declaration of intention to

give me just a minute here.

become a ci tizen of the United States, by George Tomlinson.
Q.

Okay.

And was that duly recorded?

With the Land

Office?
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A.

It was wi th the Land Office.

It was with their records

that are kept in the National Archives.
Q.

And does your office now have copies of those records?

A.

We do of these and some others.

Q.

Okay.

A.

But we got them from the National Archives.

Q.

Would you explain to the Court please the purpose of

that declaration of U.S. citizenship?
A.

Well, you could not preempt land

I really don't think I need to know that.

THE COURT
MR. CALL:

—

Okay.

We would move, your Honor, just for

purposes of our proffer, we'd move for the admission of the
exhLibits that Mr. Elliott has referred to.
THE COURT

Court will deny their admission.

That would

be Exhibits 2, 6, and 8.
MR. CALL:

Okay.

THE COURT :

But will retain them as a part of the record

as reflective of what the proffer would have been.
MR. CALL:
Q.

Thank you/r your Honor.

(BY MR. CALL)

Mr. Elliott, after Mr. Tomlinson performed

theise — this declaration or after this was recorded —
THE COURT
MR. CALL:

Is this istill part of your proffer?
This is a'.LI part of our proffer, your honor.

THE COURT :
Q.

(BY MR. CALL)

Okay.
I believe you indicated that the third
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step —

and I prepared —

let me just indicate for the Court

that I prepared this exhibit to reflect steps that you
articulated them as they occurred with respect to this
property.
A.

Uh-huh, that's correct?

Q.

And let me just give you a copy of this, if I might.
May I approach the witness, your Honor?
THE COURT:

Q.

(BY MR. CALL)

You may.
Excuse me.

Okay.

On step No. 3 there,

you indicated I believe that there has to be a proof of
preemption thatfs made at some point in time; is that
correct?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

And would you explain for the Court whether

Mr. Tomlinson made that proof and how that may have been
made.
A.

Mr. Tomlinson had Mr. Hancock prepare a document that

was accepted and was with those documents we received from
the National Archives, which is No. 6.

Can I read that?

Q.

Yes.

A.

I, Thomas Hancock, a citizen of the United States, of

lawful age, do solemnly swear that I am well acquainted with
George Tomlinson, who is a naturalized citizen of the United
States, and the head of a family consisting of a wife and one
child.

And is inhabitant of the northeast of the northwest
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quarter of lot —

and lot 2 and the west half of the

northeast quarter num —
Range 1 West.

of Section 14 of Township 1 North of

And that no other person reside upon the said

land entitled to the right of preemption.

That the said

George Tomlinson entered upon and made a settlement in person
on the said land since the 1st day of June, 1840, to wit:

On

the 17th day April, 1871, and has erected thereon a log
house, 14 by 16 feet, with roof, floors, doors, and windows,
and is a comfortable home to live in.

And has lived in the

said house and made it his exclusive home from the 17th day
of April, 1871, to the present time.

That he did not remove

from his own land within the Territory of Utah to make the
settlement above referred to.

And that he has since said

settlement plowed, fenced, and cultivated about 50 acres of
said land, and has thereon 115 rods of fencing.
Thomas Hancock.
he —

Signed by

Received by J.D. Overton, Receiver.

he says he —

that —

And

do hereby certify that the above

affidavit was taken and subscribed before me this 6th day of
February, A.D. 1872.
Q.

Okay.

And then referring to Exhibit 13, Mr. Elliott, is

that the other document you —

I believe you referred to with

respect to the proof made by Mr. Tomlinson?
A.

Yes, that is correct.

Q.

Could you —

could you either read or explain to the

court the purpose of that

—
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A.

I!ll read it because it —

it's pretty clear in the way

it's written by them.
Q.

Okay.

A.

This is Certificate No. 742 —

which is also the number

that finally the patent was given under.

Proof of right of

preemption of George Tomlinson, Section 14, Township 1 North,
Range 1 West, Preemption Act, 14th of September, 1841.
Allowed this 6th day of february, 1872, George —
it's George —
he's —

I think

G-e~o R. Maxwell, and Overton, I can't

I can't read his first name.

—

George Tomlinson,

claiming the right of preemption under the provisions of the
Act of Congress, entitled an act to appropriate the proceeds
of the public lands and to grant preemption rights, approved
September the 4th, 1841 to the northeast of the northwest,
the west half of the northeast quarter, lot 2 of Section No.
14 of Township No. 1 North of Range 1-E.
And they correct that.

There was an error in that one.

Should have been 1-W, but —

and they —

and everything else

has the W, but this does have E.
Q.

Thank you.

A.

Subject to sale at the Land Office at Salt Lake City, do

solemnly swear that I have never had the benefit of any right
of preemption under this act.

That I am not the owner of 320

acres of any land in any state or territory of the United
States.

Nor have I settled upon and improved said land to
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sell the same on speculation, but in good faith to
appropriate it to my exclusive use or benefit, and that I
have not directly or indirectly made any agreement or
contract in any way or manner with any person or persons
whatsoever by which the title which I may acquire from the
government of the United States should inure in whole or in
part to the benefit of any person except myself.
It!s signed with his mark, George Tomlinson.
George —

I,

G-0 R. Maxwell, register of the Land Office, Salt

Lake City, Utah, do hereby certify that the above affidavit
was taken and subscribed before me this 6th day of February,
A.D. 1872.

Again he signs his name G-E-0 R, period, Maxwell,

Register.
Q.

Okay.

Is it your understanding that both of these —

I've understood your testimony correctly, it f s —

if

these

documents were provided to the Land Office in order for
Mr. Tomlinson to prove up his preemption?
A.

Yeah, and Ifve been impressed at how well they kept the

records back there.
Q.

Okay.

And on your outline here, Mr. Elliott, you've

indicated that as step No. 4, that there must be a statement
of no other preemption claim.
A.

That is correct.

Q.

Do the records of the county reflect that Mr. Tomlinson

had made a preemption claim on any other property in the
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county?
A.

ITm not —

I wouldn't know on all the county r but he

himself with just what I read has stated that he has not made
any other preemptions.
Q.

And you're not familiar with any evidence in the

record

—

A.

No, no.

Q.

—

A.

No, I'm not.

Q.

Okay.

that would contradict that , are you?

What was the next step as you understood it that

Mr. Tomlinson needed to undertake in order to obtain his
pate.nt?
A.

He had to pay the money.

Q.

And is that what you refer to as the settlement on

preemption claim?
A.

Yes, that would be correct.

Q.

Is that step No. 5?

A.

That is correct.

Q.

Would you please indicate to the Court what the records

ref 1ect with respect to any payment or settlement that was
made by Mr. Tomlinson with the United States Land Office?
A.

I will.

No. 12 is again No. 742, the number which he

received his patent
Q.

Okay.

—

Let me just —

to Exhibit 12?

for the record, you're referring
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A.

I am.

Q.

Okay.

A.

This is the Receiverfs Office

Q.

Could I get you to pull that microphone down just a

And could you identify that document?

little bit there?

—

You put your hand up so that —

there.

Thank you.
(Transcriber's note:

When the witness placed

his mouth close to the microphone, it caused
the sound to be distorted and made it often
difficult to understand.)
A.

This is the Receiver's Office at Salt Lake City, Utah,

February the 6th, 1872.

Received from George Tomlinson of

Salt Lake County, Utah, the sum of $37 6.25 due in full for
the west half of the northeast quarter and the northeast
quarter of the northwest —

let's see, and the —

the west

half of the northeast quarter and the northeast quarter of
the northwest quarter and lot 2 of Section No. 14 in Section
No. 1 North of Range 1 West, containing 150 acres and 50
hundredths, at two —
you —

and it —

it's hard to read, but when

they dated the balance of $37 6.25.

And if you divide

that by 150.50 acres, that's $2.50 an acre.
Q.

Okay.

And is that the quanlity of acreage that the

county records reflect that Mr. Tomlinson had made a
preemptive claim for?
A.

That is what he received his patent for is 150.5 acres
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as described here with this description.

No. 7 also refers

to the same thing, only this is to the Register.
Q.

Okay.

record.

Let me just make —

okay.

So Exhibit No. 7 is a

Could you identify that document for the court

please.
A.

Yes, itfs No. 742, and itfs Exhibit No. 7, where he

goes —

and the Register is —

thing that the Receiver did.

pretty well says the same
That —

this one's not as easy

as to read, somebody has smeared through it, but you can
pretty tell it out.

I'll read it, too.

Lake City, Utah, February the 6th, 1872.

Land Office of Salt
It is hereby

certified that in pursuance of law, George Tomlinson, Salt
Lake County, Territory of Utah, on this date purchased of the
Register of this office the lot or west half of northeast
and you can't read what's there —

—

the northeast of the

northwest quarter and lot 2 of Section 14 in Township 1 North
of Range 1 West, containing 150 and five -- 50 hundredths of
an acre at the rate of $2.50 per acre, amounting to $376.25,
for which the said George Tomlinson has made payment in full
as required by law.
Now, therefore, be it known that on presentation of this
certificate-to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
the said George Tomlinson shall be entitled to receive a
patent for the lots above described.
Register.

G-e-o R. Maxwell,
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Q.

So it f s my understanding from what you've read,

Okay.

Mr. Elliott, and the exhibits that you've provided that
public records clearly indicate that Mr. Tomlinson paid for
the 150.5 acres.
A.

That is correct.

Q.

And that was —

those payments were made pursuant to the

preemption that he had previously made.
A.

That is correct.

That was —

this is the conclusion of

the process.
Q.

Okay.

Now, after the payment was made, as step No. 6,

you indicate that there was a call for patent from the United
States; is that correct?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

Could I refer you to Exhibit No. 9.
And let me —

before I get to that, let me just

indicate, recognizing the Court's ruling but for purposes of
the proffer, we'd ask that these exhibits be received.
THE COURT:

The Court will deny their reception;

however, they will remain a part of the record to be included
as part of the proffer that was made.
MR. CALL:
Q.

Thank you, your Honor.

(BY MR. CALL)

Okay.

Exhibit No. 9, Mr. Tomlinson.

A.

Relationship to Mr. Tomlinson

Q.

Could you identify that document.

A.

Yes.

This is a —

—

I would like to read it.

It's pretty

37

ll well self-ex
21 Q.

—

If you c o i i J d :i d e i I t :i f y j t a i i d then just tell us wh a t i t

J s and then read
r

MI i'

ihj,

"'<

nid it

is where h e ' s

I think i t ' s

where

he's --- he wants to receive his patent.
I in
•

II

A

MaLt Lake City, January —

I cai I 't r ead tl iat.

1

'. mmissioner, General Land Office.

i:o receive the patent s Lor m, land
101 practicable.
11

ender
:

To tt le

Dear Sir, I would be glad
i1" tuin as practical

-

If you can forward it without delay, you will

forever aonie thing, yours respectfully, George

romlinson, as follows, No. 7 42, Township h
W< ' ,l , ill ai i Si ir\/ e y .

11M UI of Range

/inu i r"j. f u k n o w i f h e r s saying paid up

i wihd , February the 6th, !- ^ .
Okay.
16

Exhibit —

And the payments that you referred to under
or i mder your step It , ' , "'hi t dates were those

oayments made on?
18

A.

19

were February the 6th, also in 1872.

They wen; also —

Y^'i, ! heTj f m».
V1

21
2

:

Okay.

J et me ] ook, but I'm

think they

February the 6thf 1 872, also.

And so that's the date that's reflected there in

he call for the patent,

23

Uh-huh .

Yes, i t i s,

24

".,2.

2b

testimony correctJy, I' 1i

tl ie bottom tl lere .

So the records reflect, if I've understood your
Ml I \o\ l., that full payment was made

38

l>

Mr. Tomlinson pursuant to his preemptive claim on February

I he 6th, 1872?
31 A.

Chat; is correct.

According to the records from the

4| National Aichxvo; .
51 Q.

' I, : , .

And after that payment was made, what was the

jioxl •.. u. p Nun
71 A.

(H'i'in

i of l wi 1" i i respect to these events?

Evidently, he didn't get: his patent immediately because
iavp -- N< : ). ] 9 is next in order as

I look at this.

It. is

•;j the Salt Lake Land Office talking to tl le Comrnissioner General
Washington, D.C.
11;

.

12

Y-United States Land Office, Salt Lake City, June the
• ,

14

Can I read this?

• .

'

, .,., * . » *

Washi nutcn, D.*".

tMi,

' r,, rp-a'ieral Land Office,

referring to your letter G ot

- c~h entiy Wo. '•']'i
16

Apiil

of George Tomlinson, I

have to state that James Sabine and Loan:; I,. t'lnantJer

Kr^

• •• .\n notified of the decision of the Honorable Secretary of
18

the Interior in the irtattot > ! the application to enter the

19J west half of the northeast quarter and lots 1 and 2 of
Section
21

1 i ,, Township 1 Norih, Ranqe 1 West.

And no further

steps have been taken by said parties in the case.
;

"can! i oi has

h,L.

» larae ranch in Rich County, at least 175)

23

miles distance from this place, and

(Unintelligible) lias

24

resided there for a number of years past.

25

Salt Lake, and we know of no person OJ persons living on.or

Sabine lives

laying claim to any p o r t i o n of this other than G e o r g e
T^rri] inson.

RespucLiuJ. ly, something Overton, R e c e i v e r , and

i'-o-,^ k. Maxwell, Register.
Q.

M

•.

,

I'orpanti er and M r . Sabine, are they not

the two other gentlemen that y o u m e n t i o n e d w h o had m a d e
I > t eempti ve cJ a:i rris i n 18 69?
A,

They are two of them, y e s .

1

iW

id is this to t h e same Tomlinson p r o p e r t y , t h e one

t hat V. •
A.

ieb.

O,

—

i,
lere.

identified

n,

]

AW wap?

Y e s , it's the same property that they're r e f e n i n n t<
And in . iddit. ion, they m e n t i o n lot 2 w h e n they're

r

:a 1 king about this
Okay.

A.

-- which i s below i t .
Then o n page 3 of Exhibit 19 there, is there a letter

that is -- that i s sei it * it appears you've g o t a letter
from, the United States Land Office to the Commissionei".
A

IJ unit" M

Q.

Page 3 of Exhibit 1 9.

ft

Tl l i s i s t h e — t h e r e i s a l e t t e r .

after
;.

• • n i irnber which one ?

the fact.

I would

1 i ko l o

L<:MLI

It's
It

,

-- it's

way

llh>ugh.

okay.
Number - - . .n t h e l e f t - h a n d

side i t

says,

c a s h 742,

4U

II referring i-o "i / p»U*ni number.

Territory of Utah, County of

' J 1 i" T,aoj, patent delivered by Register

md Rec^iv^r, R.K.,

.mil if says, but that's win > itOd be I "in sure i:
! referring • *.

George Tomlinson, teJJHi ilrst -July sworn, says

the identical George Tomlinson who made cash entry
i

.

;

42 for the west hai i <>) m< M'MH']<-"ist quarter and Hie

'•^Lheast quarter of the northwest quarter and Lot d oi
j Section 14, Town plat ' N^ilh, Panqe 1 West, upon the 6th day
of February, 1872.

That sometime in l<Jbif i sunt ir

in

certificate of receipt, entry No. '7 4?, hv J.B. Overton, I

i i

believe, Receiver, together with an erroneous patent to the
Co mm i .ssi

DIK.M

O£

the General Land Office for correction, and

received no receipt or —

or memorandum from him thereof

! riubs-' u Lbed.
And then he witnesses i i. ....md he swore to it on the 29th

15
16

isv '^f November, Territory of Utah, County of oa.it Lctke.

1

•:

181 of
1^1

- -• -

' • :•
:

-

"'. Ler uhere by the name I think

m guessing Master that's there.
. -

And then lie has

Carles Burns and Malcolm McDuff, each for

20

himself and not for one ai iolh«ji, :ri; ih.ii they are well

21

acquainted with George Tomlinson, who to thoi i own knowledge

22

is the identical peiswn wn - in jd<- i lie above-mentioned entry.

23

And that said Malcolm. McDuff (Unintelligible) lor himself

24

says that hf w.u.; present and saw George Tomlinson deliver his

25

Receiver's receipt to the Receiver of the hand Office as by

him, and hi s (Unintelligible) set forth.
subscribed, «:JiaJ l.i\"j Burn,.,

Malcolm H. McDuff,

m d w.is swuin to before me this

29th of -- I'm not sure of the month and I f m not sure oi: Lh*-.'
but
Q

J I lii ill il''> 1 R M n, something McMaster, Register.
And who is the land Receiver and Register?
ionnd those individuals.

They are the employees of the United Stales of America
vvnu were taking care of making sure everything is done
correctly with the preempt;!.on ].<iw.
Okay.
And set Lie i s < i i i I M"1 i HI H I,
Now, if I could refer you to Exhibit. 3 9, was there a
•.
Commissioner of

Receiver and the Register both to the
.'M General Land Office in Wash Lngt.on, I1.1.'

That is the one I did read, No. 19 -Q.

Okay.

n.

•••• and yes, it was signed by both of them, both

respectful]y, .something Overton, Receiver, and G-e-o R.
Maxwell, Register.
MR. CALL:

okay.

Your Honor, subject to the prior -- Is

'h" proffer that f s being made, we won] d ask tl le Cour t to
receive the exhibits that have been referred to by the
witness, i n d u i n g

;•..<:^ \ ^

there +"hat you read from

• ,

was the other exhibit

—
;, ,., . ^_

,

u

t]rie

exhibits that
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Ifve received as part of the proffer.

Ifve received 2, 6, 7,

8, 9, 12, 13, 19, and 20. And although they are not received
for the purpose of the matter that is here before the Court,
they will be received and retained in the record for the
purpose of the proffer.
MR. CALL:

Thank you. Was that Exhibit 2 0 that you were

referring to?
THE COURT:
Q.
A.

That was the Tomlinson patent.

(BY MR. CALL)
No.

Is that what you were reading from was —

The last one I was reading from

THE COURT:

Believe it was 19.

THE WITNESS:
Q.
A.

(BY MR. CALL)

19.
Exhibit 19.

And the one that —

both those.

—

and No. 9 and 19, Ifve read from

I have not read from the patent yet.

That!s No.

20.
Q.

No, I —

we're coming to that.

A.

Okay.

Q.

I just wanted to make sure that we had that other

exhibit that you read from in here.

Was that No. 9 that you

were reading from?
A.

Just now or before, sir°

Q.

Just —

A.

The last one —

just now, the last one that you finished.
well, we moved from No. 9 and that

letter of 1880, we moved back and talked about briefly No. 19
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again.
Q.

Okay.

he'd been —

I was referring to the one that indicated that
excuse me, that he'd been on the ground since

1865 •
A.

Well, that —

that was number

so I would assume that that!s —

— it ! s right after No. 9,

let's take a look.

Believe itfs 19.

THE COURT:

19 is the one from those.

THE WITNESS:

And that's

—

thos e are more important, but the letter I read from 18 65
where he states that —

I find it —

that may be in my files,

but not in here
Q.

Do you have a copy of that document?

(BY MR. CALL)

A.

I do.

Q.

Can I look at that?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Can I take this out and have it marked as an exhibit?

A.

Sure.

That 1s the one that mentions the 1865.

THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

You know, it appears to be redundant

—

Okay.

THE COURT:

—

because he ! s read that before from other

sources.
MR. CALL:

Okay.

THE COURT:
Q.

(BY MR. CALL)

So let!s don!t spend time doing that.
Okay, Mr. Elliott, based on those events

and the determination made by the Land Office, was there a
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patent that was issued to Mr. Elliott —

or to Mr. Tomlinson?

A.

Yes, there was.

Q.

And before we get to that, let me just ask, you've gone

through, you've read a lot of legal descriptions when you
have recited these documents upon which you have based your
opinion or your analysis.

Do those legal descriptions

include the property which is referred to on your map as the
Weiser property?
A.

Yes.

The Weiser property falls within the west half of

the northeast quarter of Section 14, Township 1 North, Range
1 West, Salt Lake Basin Meridian, and it definitely is within
the property that they're talking about here with Tomlinson.
MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
MR. CALL:

Is this still part of the proffer?

This is part of the proffer

THE COURT:

—

Still part of the proffer.

MR. CALL:

(Unintelligible)

THE COURT:

As far as I —

let us know when that ends,

will you?
MR. CALL:

I will, your honor.

THE COURT:
Q.

(BY MR. CALL)

Hope that ends sometime soon.
Okay.

Would you then identify the patent

that was received by Mr. Tomlinson?
A.

Yes, No. 20 is the patent that was received by

Mr. George Tomlinson, September the 25th, 1873.
Q.

And is that patent duly recorded on the records of the

45

county?
A.

It is.

It's recorded in Book C, page 458 of the Davis

County Recorder's Office.
MR. CALL:

We move, your Honor, for admission of that

exhibit based on the same proffer.
THE COURT:

20 is received under the same limitation and

solely for the purpose of the proffer.
Q.

(BY MR. CALL)

Since, Mr. Elliott —

the proffer as well.
finished.

and this is part of

I'll let the Court know when we're

But since the patent was received, has the county

considered this property to be privately owned since that
time?
A.

Yes, we've considered it as private property.

taxed it as the property throughout the years.

We've

We still show

on the present record that these individuals own those
properties that -- that have come down from the Tomlinson
patent, the properties.
Q.

Is there anything in the county records that indicated

that —

that this property was transferred to the Utah

Central Railroad?
A.

Nothing in the records.

There are maps that were

prepared by Oregon Shortline Railroad where they claimed it,
because they couldn't find a deed, I assume.

That's an

assumption on my part, but they did on their map say that it
was —

they got it through the December 15th, 1870, date.
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Q.

And on your map, do you —

do the records of the county

reflect that the Denver Rio Grande actually purchased right
of ways from Tomlinson or his successors in interest?
A.

They did.

They purchased both from Thomas Hancock and

George Tomlinson their strip of grounds that lie immediately
west of the hundred-foot strip of the Utah Central Railroad.
Q.

Okay.

And are those right of ways, were those

properties that that railroad purchased, are they within the
400-foot right of way that has been asserted by the Railroad
or that has been determined to exist by the Court?
A.

Yes, they are.

They fall within that 400-foot corridor.

Q

And have you attached copies of those deeds?

A

Yes.

Q

Which deeds are those?

A

Exhibit No. 5.

Q.

Can you explain that document please.

A.

I think itfs --

Q.

You donTt have to read it, but if you could just explain

They're —

what it is.
A.

It is a deed —

excuse me, No. 5 is not the correct one.

That's on the other side of the Great Salt Lake and Hot
Springs Railway Company.
Q.

Okay.

A.

That also falls within the 400-foot corridor somewhat,

but the Denver and Rio Grande ones are No. 32, No. 33, and
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No. 34.
Q.

Okay.

Let me have you turn to Exhibit 32, if you would

please.
A.

Okay.

Q.

Would you just —

just very —

you just explain what that —

without reading it, would

what that conveyance was as

reflected on the county records.
A.

According to county records, Book H, page 32 of the

County Recorderfs Office, George and Matilda Tomlinson

—

well, they got George and M. Tomlinson, to the Denver and Rio
Grande Railroad Company.
Q.

Okay.

A.

And the date was 16th day of May, 1883.

Q.

Okay.

A.

They are conveying the property to Denver and Rio Grande

And they're conveying to whom?

Western Railroad.
Q.

And when you say the property, you 1 re not referring to

all the Tomlinson property, you1re referring to this
property -A.

No, just -- just for that area where the railroad went

through Tomlinson1s property.
Q.

On the west side of their property,

A.

On the west side of the Utah Central Railroad.

Q.

And Exhibit —

what was the other exhibit you referenced

where property was sold to the Denver and Rio Grande within
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the 400-foot right of way?
A.

One of them was 33.

Q.

Okay.

A.

And also, yeah, 34.

I think —

believe you mentioned 34.
And those were —

those were both

deeded by Mr. Tom Hancock to the Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company.

Properties that also fall within

the 400-foot corridor.
Q.

Okay.

And did Mr. Hancock obtain his interest from Mr.

Tomlinson?
A.

He —

he obtained his interest from Mr. Malcolm McDuff,

who obtained his interest from George w. Tomlinson.
Q.

And so these —

if I understand your testimony

correctly, the records reflect that the Denver Rio Grande
Railroad purchased these properties from either Mr. Tomlinson
or his successor in interest

—

A.

That is

—

Q.

—

A.

That is correct according to the records of the Davis

as reflected on your map.

County Recorder!s office.
MR. CALL:

Okay.

We ! d move for the admission of those

exhibits on the same condition, your Honor.
THE COURT:

33 and 34 have already been received as part

of the other testimony relative to the deeds.
limited.
proffer.

It was

I will receive 32 only for the purpose of the
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Q.

(BY MR. CALL)

Okay,

Now, Mr. Elliott, I believe you've

indicated, and I would just like some further clarification
as to properties that exist within this 400-foot corridor
from the Salt Lake County line to the Weber County line.
A.

Yes.

Q.

I believe you indicated that there —

that you have

taken the time and have looked at deeds within that corridor
and patent dates to see if this —

the events that occurred

with respect to Mr. Tomlinson!s property is similar or
dissimilar to those other properties; is that correct?
A.

That is correct.

They

—

Q.

What have you —

A.

There's many different ways that they've taken property.

what have you determined?

Some were the homestead, some were through the college funds,
some even purchased through the same process from the Union
Pacific Railroad because they owned lands in this area also.
But it's —
Tomlinsons.

but a lot of them are preemptioned, like
And the thing that I noticed most is that,

again, I stress that the majority of the patents, most of the
patents, not all of them, but most of them received their
actual patent from the United States government after
December the 15th, 1870.
Q.

And do those records, at least the ones that you've

looked at, do the county records reflect that those
properties are still privately owned on the records of the
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county?
A.

Yes, they are.

Q.

Okay.

And is it your opinion as the County Surveyor

that those properties were not public domain or public ground
in December of 187 0?
A.

The one they made themself through — most of them took

from the settler a right of way through there a hundred foot
wide.
Q.

By purchase?

A.

By purchase.

But again, the patent dates fall —

fall

after December 15th, 1870, and unless you go back and request
from the National Archives the information in relationship to
that patent, then everything falls into place.

They make

their declaration, they prove up on it, they are possessing
it, they have neighbors that testify to that, that they1re on
it and they're having it. And finally, they get the patent,
but the patent doesn't come immediately.

It takes a process

of time.
Q.

I understand.

If -- if a determination were made or is

made that the patent is the controlling date, could you
explain to the Court approximately what percentage of ground
between Salr Lake County and Weber County would be perhaps
affected by that determination?
A.

I think I'd be safe if I said at least 70 percent would

be affected by that act.
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Q.

And just for clarification, that is, you're saying that

the patents on approximately 70 percent of the properties
between Salt Lake County and Weber County were received after
the December 15th, 1870 act?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

But that they're treated as private property for

purposes of the county because of the preemptive or homestead
or other claims that existed before the patent was issued.
A.

The county doesn't have the records of the archives

unless they send for them.
Q.

Yeah.

A.

In our office, we've sent for some of those of different

parcels.

I've —

as I mentioned before, I'm impressed with

the records kept by the National Archives.

But the patent,

again, is not the beginning of ownership in this case.
like a contract.

It's the conclusion.

It's

And if I make a

contract with you and I follow through all the steps, then I
am entitled to have that automobile or piece of property at
the end of that time.

And that's what the patent does with

all these individuals through Davis County.
Q.

And the same is true with Mr. Tomlinson in this case.

A.

Yeah, he's no different.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Except the only difference I can see with Mr. Tomlinson

is that with all the confusion they did not, or we've never
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found as of yet, a deed to Utah Central Railroad.

But that

is not enough reason to say itTs not private land.
Q.

Right.

And I believe —

did you testify before —

and I

apologize if I!ve asked this, but did you indicate that the
records also indicated that the Utah Central Railroad
negotiated and actually purchased a portion of the land
within —
A.

No —

that's adjacent from Mr. Tomlinson?
well, yeah, it's his land, but they got it from

another man that declared —

made his declaration —

declaratory statement, Pomantier
Q.

Okay.

A.

—

—

and then lost it through —

They wouldn't give him land.

a

through the Land Office.

But yes, they took a deed from

him for one-half of it through Tomlinsonfs property, Utah
Central Railroad did.
Q.

So the county records reflect that the Utah Central

Railroad purchased or purport -- or purchased a deed -A.

From Louis L. Pomantier, yes.

Q.

Okay.

As to property that falls within the scope of Mr.

Tomlinson's land.
A.

Yes, absolutely.

Q.

And that was one of the —

I believe —

was that one of

the exhibits that you presented?
A.

It was.

Q.

Can you identify that very quickly so we might have that
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admitted.
A.

I think it's already been admitted, but I 'm not sure.
THE COURT:

Which one is it?

THE WITNESS:
the Railroad.

It's —

it's where he gets the deed from

It •s No. 4.

THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

That has been

—

Right.
— referred to, but it -— and has been

received.

Q.

THE WITNESS:

Yeah.

(BY MR. CALL)

Okay.

We —

that's No. 4?

A.

That's No. 4 of the exhibit.

Q.

Okay.
THE COURT:

E show that's the Louis deed; is that

correct?
THE WITNESS:

That's a Louis Pomantier to Utah Central

Railroad, that is correct, Judge.
Q.

(BY MR. CALL)

And this, this is the deed we've just

referenced, is it reflected on your chart somewhere in some
color?
A.

Yes, it's th(3 one in yellow.

It covers one-half of

Tomlinson's property, north south.
Q

And so it does actually —

the piece that the Utah

*

Central was purchcasing actually is adjacent to the Weiser
boundary.
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A.

That is correct. Again, you need to understand the

des —

excuse me.

not tied —

The descriptions as given back then were

as it went through the Utah Central Railroad,

once in a while I found where they tied it to a section
corner or a quarter corner.

Most the time, like here, they

just said 50 foot each side of the survey line or center of
the road through the south half of the northeast quarter of
Section 14, Township 1 North, Range 1 West. And so they —
and so we (Unintelligible) where itTs at by the other deeds.
Q.

Okay.

And is that generally acceptable in your

practice —
A.

Well, yes —

Q.

—

in these kind of ancient matters?

A.

—

because that's really where it's at. And they got 50

feet each side of it as they went through the —

according to

Pomantier's deed, but Pomantier's deed became non-useful with
the action of the U.S. Land Surveyor's Office.
Q.

And that's because Mr. Tomlinson's claim was determined

to be —
A.

Superior.

Q.

—

A.

Yeah, he proved —

superior to that of Mr. Pomantier.
did everything he had to do to obtain

that patent.
MR. CALL:

Okay.

We would on the same conditions move

for the admission of Exhibit 4, your Honor.
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Itfs already been received.

THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

Okay.

THE COURT:
Q.

May I have just one minute?

Uh-huh.

(BY MR. CALL)

Okay.

Now, Mr. Elliott, it ! s my

understanding that you've also made some calculations with
respect

—

THE COURT:
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:

Is this still part of the proffer?
This is not.
Okay.

I want to give Mr. Devashrayee an

opportunity to ask any questions as a part of the proffer.
MR. CALL:

Okay.

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:

(Mr. Devashrayee stands away from the

microphone and is difficult to hear.)

You know, I really

—

I guess I wanna make a comment first just for the record,
that it be noted that there was a lot of leading going on
(Unintelligible) legal conclusions made.

I object to those

being made during the proffer, just for the record.

As far

as the actual proffer's concerned and what Mr. Elliott was
making —

or was testifying to, it really becomes a legal

issue, which I probably (Unintelligible) ask him to assume —
make some assumptions on my cross-examination.

So I think

that's what I'm gonna do, and I'm gonna leave it at that.
EXAMINATION
BY THE COURT:
Q.

Okay.

I'm going to ask a few questions because I think
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the record needs to be clarified.

First of all, Mr. Elliott,

if you'll look at the timeline which you've been referred to
relative to the preemption and patent process.

You testified

that the act of Congress which created the easement occurred
on December 15th, 1870; is that right?
A.

That's for Utah Central Railroad.

Q.

Yes.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Other than the declaration statement and the declaration

of intent to be a U.S. citizen, were there any of those steps
that had been carried out by Mr. Tomlinson prior to December,
1870?
A.

That's a yes or no question.
I would say —

or no

I don't know how to answer yes because

—

—

Q.

It's a yes or no question, Mr. Elliott, and I'll

A.

Okay.

Q.

—

just review them with you.

—

Step 1 was the

declaration statement.
A.

Okay.

Q.

He had made that apparently in 1869, based upon your

testimony.
A.

That's correct.

Q.

No. 2 was the declaration of intent to be a citizen,

which was made in 18 69.

Step 3 was the proof of preemption.

That was done, according to your testimony, on July 6th,
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1872

Statement of no other preemption of claim was done

February 6th, 1872.
A.

Is that one -- let me look.

Q.

Uh-huh.

A.

Hold on just a minute.

Q.

No, thatfs not No. 6.

ThatT s number 6?

That's the statement of

Your testimony is clearly that the only two

preemption.

step s that he had taken of all of those steps was the
declaration statement and the intent to file to be a U.S.
citizen.

Would that be correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

A.

May I

Q.

No.

A.

Okay.

Q.

Was there —

—

Itfs a yes or no question.

the patent in this ma tter was not issued

unti 1 when?
A.

it was -- we f d have to 1 ook for sure, but I

It was —

thin k it's September the 25th of
I don't want
Q.

!

73, but let's check that.

—

I think that's what it would indicate, so it was long

after 1870; is that correct?
A.

This is correct.

Q.

Anything from the records that you have reviewed that

indi cated that any improvements, either the home that was
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apparently placed there in —

later or the cultivation

occurred on any of the easement that was included within the
400-foot right of way?

Do you have any in:formation from the

record that you can recall?
A

Can I read —

refer to that again?

I think we need to

refer to No. 6.

Q

You can do that if you ! d like to.

A.

Okay.

This is George Tomlinson!s having his neighbor or

someone, a citizen, anyway, Thomas Hancock testify -Q

I realize that, but is there anything from that record

that indicates to you where on the what, hundred and some odd
acres it was located?
A

The 150.5 acres?

Q

Uh-huh.

A

The home, you mean?

Q

Yeah.

A

Prior to the

Q

Or the improvements?

A

You mean prior to this 7

Q

Yes.

—

Is there anything from the reco:rd at all that

iridicates where on the hundred and —

what is it?

128 —- 150

ac:res?
A

150.5 acres

Q

The improvements were located.

qilestion.

—
That1 3 a yes or no
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A.

When you say —

Q.

Were there —

now again, rephrase it then.

I

—

is there anything from the record that

you've seen that indicates where the home or the cultivation
occurred on that 150 acres?
A.

The cultivation, your Honor, was 50 acres, which was

Q.

I realize that, but do you know where it was from the

—

records?
A.

I can pretty well tell where the home was at, but it's

after the fact with the next deed.
Q.

Your answer is no then; is that right?

A.

Not —

not at December 15th, 1870.

Q.

Okay.

Let's —

wanna ask
A.

Okay.

Q.

—

I have a couple of other questions I

—

because I think the record needs to be clarified.

It's true that at the time the declaration was filed in 1869,
based upon your testimony, that there were two other
competing declarations on the property; is that true?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

The other question I would ask, do you have any

knowledge of whether or not D. and R.G. Railroad was ever
granted any kind of an easement along its right of way?
A.

Only by these individuals at that time.

I'm looking at

the old records now.
Q.

I understand, but there was never any act of Congress
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that gave the D. and R.G. any kind of right of way, was
there?
A.

No.

Q

They had to purchase it, didn't they -—

*

That's why they purchased it.

A.

That ! s right.

Q.

—

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay

a.LI of it?

The fourth question is, that I have in that

rega.rd, the County Recorder!s Office lists property based
upon fee 1title ownership; is that correct?
A.

Most of the time that's absolutely correct, yes.

Q.

And records any easement thereon as a burden on that fee

titl<B; is that correct?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

Based upon that in Davis County then <and in any county,

at 1(sast where Utah Central Railroad goes, the private
property <Dwner would be listed under the easement of the
Railroad; is that correct?
A.

They arenft.

Do you follow what —

they're not listed

unde.r any easement of the Railroad in our .records.
Q.

So do you exclude all of the easement property of the

Railroad from the private property owner in Davis County?
A.

Yes.

It does not show that they have 200 feet each

side —
Q.

No, ]10, no, what I!m saying, but the ]private property
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owner goes right up to the Railroad, doesn't he?
A.

Up to the hundred foot, yes.

Q.

It doesn!t show the easement.

A.

That is correct.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I have no further questions.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. CALL:
Q.

Mr. Elliott —

and maybe we need to mark that exhibit.

I thought you had a document that you referred to that
indicated that Mr. Tomlinson had been on that property since
1865; isn!t that correct?
A.

Well, that is true, yeah.

Q.

We'd like to mark that.

—

Ifd still like to mark that exhibit.

MR. CALL:

doesn't that show that

THE COURT:
evidence

—

But thatfs not the issue, Mister

THE COURT:

shows that —

Do you have that

It

—

I think he already has that in the

—

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Well, I think you took it
—

THE WITNESS:

—

and he's read from various documents

—

I think you took it from me and had it

entered.
MR. CALL:

I haven't had that entered.

You read it and

I'd like to -- we can mark it during a break, but I'd like to
just have

—
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You!re welcome to have that in there.

THE COURT:

have no objection to that.
MR. CALL:

We 1 11

I

—

Okay.

THE COURT:

—

make it as part of the proffer.

I think

there is testimony to the effect that he was on the property
since 1840.
Q.

(BY MR. CALL)

Right.

And —

and Mister —

Mr. Elliott,

could I just address for just a minute the issue about the
Land Office?

I believe you testified that that Land Office

in the Territory of Utah had not opened until 18 69; is that
correct?
A.

Having read recently in the past, it —

it indicated the

Utah office was opened in 1869.
Q.

Okay.

And is it your understanding that prior to that

time, there was nowhere prior to the time that these
preemptions and so forth were filed in 1869, to your
understanding of the matter, there was noplace where
Mr. Tomlinson could have filed anything prior to that time
with respect to his claim to the property?
A.

I would think not.

Q.

Okay.

And is it your opinion and testimony today, Mr.

Elliott, that the records indicate that Mr. Tomlinson was
physically on that property prior to 1870?
A.

Again, we can only go by the testimony of Mr. Thomas

Hancock, and he indicates that he's been there for a long
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II time.

He talks about the number of improvements.

I mean, I

2

think it!s 200 rods of fencing.

3

of fencing.

4

they didnft have a John Deere tractor.

5

horse or a mule.

6

cultivation and plow doesn't happen in a couple of days.

7

Q.

8

documents, some of them that you've looked to, refer to 1840,

9

what's your understanding with respect to that?

Okay.

Thatfs 1897 and a half feet

He talks about 50 acres as being cultivated, and

And you —

You used an oxen or a

to put 50 acres under

And with respect to the fact that these —

these

Is that the

10

form that was used or could you give some insight or help to

11

the Court as to why it's referring to 1840 in some of those

12

records?

13

A.

14

at Edmund Webb's and also George Tomlinson's, and they're

15

both the same —

16

go through this process, and they both say since, which means

17

after the date of 1840.

18

Q.

19

that there —

20

something to do with the 1840 preemption act or something of

21

that nature?

22

cited?

23

A.

24

preemption, they made the law specific so it didn't cover

25

some squatters that were already on the ground in 1830 and

I think the reason —

Okay.

Again —

this is my opinion.

I've looked

they're almost mirrors of each other as they

Is that —

is that —

is it your understanding

that the reason that's there is that has

Or what's your understanding as to why that's

again, reading books in relationship to
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1840.

And I think that that was probably their intent when

they put that date in there.
Q.

So it's not your testimony that he was on the ground

—

it's not your reading of the documents or your opinion that
he f s asserting that he was on the ground in 1840.
A.

No.

It's since.

Q.

Since 1840.

A.

Yeah.

Q.

And from the records that you've reviewed, it indicates

that he was on the ground at least as early as 1865.
A.

That is correct.

Q.

Now —

and then I believe you also and the Court

referenced the declaration of his intent to be a citizen of
the United States; is that correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Is —

to your knowledge, is there any reason for that,

such a declaration to be recorded with the Land Office other
than to perfect a preemption claim?
A.

That's part of the process.

Q.

Of the preemption process?

A.

He had to do that to get his land.

Q.

Now, Mr. Elliott, it's my understanding that you have

also performed some calculations to address how much of the
Weiser property
THE COURT:

—
Now, wait a minute.

Is that the end of the

65

proffer?
MR. CALL:

Oh, it is, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Anything further, Mr. Devashrayee, as

far as the proffer?
MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
THE COURT:

Okay.

No, your Honor.
That testimony then that —

up to

this point is considered to be part of the proffer, is not to
be considered by this Court in resolution of the issue that
is before the Court at this time, but will be a part of the
record for any purpose subsequent to this.
MR. CALL:

Thank you.
So now we 1 11 go back to the testimony

THE COURT:

relative to other matters, and you may proceed.
MR. CALL:

Thank you, your Honor.

And I just wanna

indicate to the court, if I might, that we very much
appreciate that because of the time that's been spent here
and these -- these new matters, as the Court knows, that
these records are old and —

and it ! s not easy to go through

all of this, and we appreciate the Court's indulgence in
allowing all of this important evidence to be placed on the
record for further proceedings, though not for today's issue.
Q.

(BY MR. CALL)

Mr. Elliott, it's my understanding that

you have also performed a calculation as to the amount of
property that would —

amount of the Weiser property as

reflected on your map that lies outside of the 400-foot
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corridor.
A.

Yes.

Can I read this?

Q.

Certainly.

A.

I, Max B. Elliott, professional land surveyor, No.

141269 dash 2201, in the State of Utah, hereby certify that I
have on this day, Wednesday, December the 7th, 2005,
calculated the area that is outside the 200 feet from the
centerline of Utah Central Railroad on the Weiser property.
(Unintelligible) warranty deed found in Book 1-C, page 519,
Thomas Hancock and his wife, Sarah Ann Hancock, to Joseph W.
Mellon.
Q.

The area equals 2376.66 square feet or 0.0546 acres.

Okay.

Which deeds do you refer —

were you referring to

when you made that opinion?
A.

I was referring to the deed of Mr. Hancock that he and

his wife deeded to Joseph W. Mellon.
Q.

Could I —

I just need to get a number on that so that I

can move to have that admitted.
A.

It was found in Book 1-C, page 519 of the
THE COURT:

Have we talked about that deed before now

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

—

Mr. Elliott?

No.

Okay.

What exhibit was it?

I'm

Was it the No. 5, the Hancock deed?
I think —

mentioned it, your Honor.
THE COURT:

—

Yes.

trying to find it here.
THE WITNESS:

—

I think we have not
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THE WITNESS:

It's No. 36.

Maybe it has been entered.

Irm not sure.
THE COURT:

It has been entered.

THE WITNESS:
MR. CALL:

Okay.

That's thirty —

I guess we ! d move for the

admission of 36 outside the proffer.
THE COURT:

It wasn't iss —

it wasn't offered in

conjunction with the proffer.
MR. CALL:
Q.

Oh, okay.

(BY MR. CALL)

Thank you, your Honor.

Did you consider —

in reaching that

opinion, did you consider the other deeds that you had
which deeds in addition to that deed did you consider
A.

Again —

—
—

again, in coming to that conclusion, I looked

at the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad deed and description
that is on the west side of the hundred-foot corridor of the
Utah Central Railroad as per the deeds of Davis County.
Q.

Okay.

Which number is —

which deed is that?

I'm sorry, Mr. Elliott, we need to get these admitted
and we need to know what —

which of these documents you have

relied upon in making your opinion.
A.

I think it's No. 33.
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

It is, and that has already been received.
Okay.

THE COURT:
Q.

I'll look fast and --

(BY MR. CALL)

Outside the proffer?

Outside the proffer.
Okay.

Any of these other deeds that you
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considered in making that determination?
A.

No,

Those two pretty well defined what was shown on the

rest of the records going through Davis County of the
hundred-foot corridor, and also the Mellon description
describes their west line as being the east line of the
O.S.L. Railroad Line.
Q.

And which exhibit is the Mellow description?

A.

That's the one we just

Q.

Is that 36?

A.

I think it is.
THE COURT:

—

Let me look.

It is 36.

THE WITNESS:

Okay.

Q.

(BY MR. CALL)

Okay.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

Did you —

From Hancock to Joseph Mellon?

did you look at any other —

I guess

you may have looked at other materials in formulating your
opinion?

They don't necessarily have to be in the record,

but let me just
A.

—

No, I worked strictly —

I worked strictly from the

records of those two descriptions.
description, although it's old
Q.

Yes.

A.

—

is well written.

And the Mellon

—

You don't usually find one that old

that has that good of closure.
Q.

Okay.

So again, in concluding, Mr. Elliott, it's your
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opinion that there is 2376.66 square feet or .054
A.

Sixth acre.

Q.

—

—

sixth acres of property that lies outside of the

400-foot corridor that's been addressed in this case.
A.

That is correct.
MR. CALL:

Thank you, your honor.

we have for right now from Mister
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

That's —

that's all

—

You may cross-examine.
-- Elliott.

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:

Thank you, your honor.

Move this up a

little closer.
THE COURT:

It's pretty hard to move.

You need to leave

it right there or you won't be in the video.
MR. DEVASHRAYEE:

Okay.

I'm good.

I'm fine.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
Q.

Morning, Mr. Elliott.

A.

Good morning, Jeff.

Q.

Nice to see you again.

Just a few questions really.

You haven't done a boundary survey.
A.

I have not.

Q.

And Exhibit 1, the plat that you've prepared, that's not

a survey.
A.

That is not.

It's compiled from the records of the

county.

nnom A
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Q.

And you haven't been to the property.

You haven't

actually walked the property.
A.

I have not.

Q.

Okay.

Let's go ahead and take a look at that Exhibit 1

for a second.
May I approach, your Honor?
THE COURT:

You may.

You may wanna turn it a little bit

so Max can see it a little better.
Q.

(BY MR. DEVASHRAYEE)

Elliott.

All right.

(Unintelligible) Mr.

First of all, on this plat, you marked the 200 feet

width right of way on each side of centerline, correct?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Of December 15th, 1870, yes.

Q.

I want to make —

me, okay?

And that's referencing the 400-foot land grant

I want you to make an assumption for

I want you to assume, first of all, that the land

grant to Utah Central was a valid, effective land grant.
Okay?

—

Is that fair?

Can you make that assumption?

A.

I can make that assumption.

Q.

(Unintelligible) assumption.

(Unintelligible)

I want you to also make

—

A.

Understanding that's just an assumption on your part.

Q.

I want you to assume that it's supported by governing

law, okay?
MR. CALL:

Your honor, I'm gonna have to object to the
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form of these questions.
issues.

He ! s not asking the witness factual

He's asking him to make legal conclusions based on

assumptions.
THE COURT:
Q.

Overrule the objection.

(BY MR. DEVASHRAYEE)

I want you to assume that it!s

supported by governing law, okay?
is the critical date.

Okay?

And that the patent date

For purposes of

(Unintelligible) that kind of thing.
fair?

Go ahead.

Is that okay?

Is that

Just make the assumption for me, okay?
I!m having a hard time making the assumption because it

A.

doesn!t correlate with what I know.
THE COURT:

You don!t have to worry about what you

know -THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:
Q.

Okay.

All right.

(Unintelligible)
All right.

(BY MR. DEVASHRAYEE)

Making that assumption.

Just make the assumption that it's

supported, that that 400-foot land grant right of way is
support by a pronouncement of the United States Supreme
Court.
Okay.

I want you to make that assumption as well, okay?
If we make that assumption, then the only property

that we have that's depicted on your plat 1 -- on your plat,
Exhibit 1, is that small triangle
A.

That

Q.

—

—

—

that's outside of the right of way, correct?

That
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Mr. Weiser owns as you (unintelligible), correct?
A.

That would be correct.

Q.

Okay.

A.

I do know John.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Oh, yeah.

Q.

Okay.

Now, you know John Stall, correct?

You've met him before.
I've known John for years.

Now, Mr. Stall is —

he's done a boundary survey.

And he's been out to the property, all right?

And Mr. Stall

calculates this square footage outside the 400-foot land
grant right of way as 1635 square feet, or .0375 acres.
Would you have any reason to disagree with Mr. Stall's
conclusions based on the fact that he's been out there and
he's done a survey?
MR. CALL:

Your Honor, I just have to object to the form

of the question.
THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:
survey.

This is cross-examination.
Overruled.
I haven't —

I have not looked at John's

I have not looked at John's calculations.

And until

I did that, I couldn't answer that.
Q.

(BY MR. DEVASHRAYEE)

Okay.

Let me ask you this:

a small area, though.
A.
Q.

Yes.
(Unintelligible)

A.

Yeah, (Unintelligible) not come with much.

Q.

Could I see your —

I've never seen that before

It is
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(Uni ntelligible).

Thank you.

And the area you come up with,

2376 .66 square feet or .05 (unintelligible) acres, that rs
from your review of the deeds.
A.

That is from the deeds, yes, absolutely.

Q.

Okay.

A.

We did.

Q.

—

A.

I do.

Q.

And I asked you when we met if you would take any

Now, we met a couple days ago

—

do you remember that?

exception to where the centerline is depicted in the railroad
location maps.

Do you remember when I asked you that?

A.

And I —

Q.

The railroad location maps that are on -- on file with

and I don't have any problem with that.

the Davis County Recorder.
A.

That's correct.

Q.

You take no issue (Unintelligible).

A.

I have —

Q.

Okay.
MR. CALL:

I have no issue.

Your Honor, I guess I object again.

goes well beyond the direct.
THE COURT:

THE COURT:

—

Well, let me indicate that he can call him

back as his own witness
MR. CALL:

He f s asking

Th:Is

—

Right.
—

and in the interest of time, I'm gonna

allow him to go beyond that, and you1re

—
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MR. CALL:

Okay.
-- welcome to cross--examine or a nything you

THE COURT:
want to.
MR. CALL:

Very well.
But I don't wanna have Mr. Elliott down here

THE COURT:

for two days on things we
MR. CALL:

Okay.

THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

—

can take care all. at once.

Okay.

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
that *s - - thatfs
THE COURT:

—

Well, it is west of center line,

—
And it is relevant.

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:

Mister —

Go ahead.

Mr. Elliott has testified to

the cent erline.
Q.

(BY ]MR. DEVASHRAYEE)

Okay.

If Mr. Stall has relied on

those railroad location maps to determine the centerline and
as a result determining the property that!s lying outside of
the 400- foot land grant right of way, could you - - if he s
done that (Unintelligible)
A.

Let me

Q.

"

—

—

take any exception to the

— to his calcu lation of

the squa re footage of 635 square feet; outside of the 400 land
grant ri ght of way?
A.

How much?

Q.

Six —

1635 square feet.
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A.

See, we're only talking —

small this is.

and you don't realize how

We're not talking a lot of difference between

1600 and 2300 square feet.
Q.

(Unintelligible)

A.

It's not much property.
THE COURT:

Mr. Elliott, you need to understand, it

isn't much, but that's why we're here.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:

Okay.
Okay.
But —

probably if he has —

but there again, I would think that

if he come up with a survey out there

on the ground that was two feet different than mine, my
calculations from the deed, it would easily create with the
distance that I calculate down along that sliver on the
west —

on the westerly side of what's outside of the 400

feet —

you follow me?

Q.

(BY MR. DEVASHRAYEE)

A.

Right.

If he was off two or three feet in reality out there on

the ground from the de —

from the record, it would add up

probably to six, seven, eight hundred feet alone, square
feet.
Q.

Okay.

Just let me confirm.

A.

Okay.

Q.

First of all, I want you to assume —

you say you'd take

no exception with the centerlines depicted on the railroad

1

location maps, correct?

2

A.

Yeah, because they1re just a map.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

Mister —

5

A.

And let me —

6

Q.

No, hold on, Mr. Elliott.

7

Stall relied on those railroad location maps to determine the

8

centerline, okay?

9

okay?

(Unintelligible)

Okay.

let!s say that Mister
let me say

And let's say that

—

—
Let f s just assume that Mr.

And that he's been out to the property,

And let's also —

I'm gonna tell you that Mr. Stall

10

really takes no exception to your eastern boundary of that

11

that small triangle representing, as we're calling it, the

12

outside property or the property that Mr. Weiser's claiming,

13

okay?

14

agrees with you on that boundary and he's taking the

15

centerline from the railroad location maps and his own

16

walking of the property, would you have any reason to dispute

17

his calculation of 635 square feet?

18

A.

19

his notes and calculated it myself.

20

that surveyors have not been correct.

21

Q.

22

piece of property.

23

A.

If that's true, if he agrees —

—

if he essentially

I wouldn't answer that until I looked at his survey and

Okay.

I've seen too many times

And we're agreeing, though, it's a very small

Yeah, absolutely.

24

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:

25

THE COURT:

I'm done.

Redirect.

Thank you, your Honor.
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MR. CALL:

We don't have redirect on that particular

issue.
THE COURT:

You may step down, Mr. Elliott.

THE WITNESS :
THE COURT:

Am I free to go?

You are free to go.

THE WITNESS :
MR. CALL:

Thank you.

Thank you.

We reserve the right recall Mr. Elliott on

rebuttal if necessary.
THE COURT:

You understand that, Mr. Elliott?

They'll

contact you if they need you back, but you don t need to stay
here
THE WITNESS :
THE COURT:

All right.

Thanks for coming.

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
THE WITNESS :
THE COURT:

(Unintelligible)

Thank you, Jeff.

Thanks, Steve.

Anything else you need?

Got all your stuff?

Don' t take any of our exhibits.
THE WITNESS :
THE COURT:

Okay.

THE WITNESS :
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:

If I get it all, I'll be lucky.

Thank you.

Call your next witness please
Can I have just one

—

Sure.
May we just take a minute break, your Honor?
Sure, we'll take a ten-minute break.

We'll
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be back at 11:10.
(The Court took a brief recess.)
THE COURT:
are present.

We're back in session.

Parties and counsel

You may call your next witness, Mr. Call.

MR. CALL:

Your honor, if I just may indicate to the

Court that the during the break, we have met, Mr. Devashrayee
and Ms. Peck and I, and we have settled this issue with
respect to the property.

And we have stipulated that the

property that lies outside of the 400-foot corridor is 2000
square feet.

And that I'll just indicate is just a

compromise between the 2377 feet testified to by Mr. Elliott
and the 1635 square feet that would have been testified to by
Mr. Stall.
And we've agreed that for purposes of that calculation,
that the centerline is the centerline that was indicated by
Mr. Stall in his document, but that centerline stipulation is
for that purpose and not for purposes of altering or changing
any of the testimony with respect to the deeds and the
records that were —
Mister

that was —

that was testified to by

—

THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

The proffered
The proffer --

THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

—

—
—

information.
yes.

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:

Your Honor, can I just for the record,
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I wanna specify the centerline that Mr. Stall specified.
THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:

It is —

the centerline is located

366.62 feet east of the quarter corner common to Sections 11
and 14.
THE COURT:

Section 11 and 14?

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:

Sections 11 and 14.

Right, John?

Or

in other words, it's coincident with track No. 1 as shown on
the maps.

And we just figured, your Honor, we're talking

about such a small piece of property, that it ! s not gonna
matter much in terms of the rest of the issues that —

we

figured that'd make you happy.
THE COURT:

It does make me happy, and shows that you

are, as I believed all along, reasonable counsel when it gets
right down to it.
MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
Steve will agree here
THE COURT:

Your Honor, could I say one other

—

—

Yes.

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:

—

to this, it doesn't mean —

just —

just because we stipulate

you know, we still have issues

of, you know, he still has his claims of trespass, forcible
detainer.

We of course disagree with that.

There's still

issues of why we're out on that property to begin with.
has already been briefed.
valuation.

And then there's the issue of

It's after that, assuming that Mr. Weiser

That
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ll prevails on those claims, so we got a couple more steps to
2
3I

take, but this is a big one and now we can move on.
THE COURT:

It does appear to be a significant one and

4

that we can move on to these other issues that I'm not sure

5

are any less complicated, but at least we have a beginning

6

point on those matters.

7

any of those at this time?

8
9

MR. CALL:

Are we able to go on —

I don't believe so.

do, your Honor, is that —

forward on

What we would like to

is maybe agree on a briefing

10

schedule on some of the issues.

11

damages and the trespass issues, we'd like an opportunity to

12

file a motion with the Court setting forth the points and

13

authorities that —

14

gathered with respect to the effect of the preemption issue.

15

THE COURT:

I think before we address

and the legal research that we have

Okay.

I am not gonna consider that,

16

Counsel.

17

given you the opportunity to take the record.

18

have been before the Court a long time ago if you wanted to

19

raise those issues.

20

them a part of the record so that as you wanna go up on

21

appeal, it's there, but I am not gonna reconsider that issue.

22

I've already ruled on that particular issue.

MR. CALL:

I've

That should

I'm not gonna preclude you from keeping

But we would like at least the opportunity to

23

file a motion and have it denied so that the Court of Appeals

24

doesn't —

25

motion under Rule 52

doesn't say, well, you should have filed your
—

81

THE COURT:

I have denied your motion right now, so you

don't need to go to the briefing expense.

I've —

I'll rule

from the bench that I've already considered that matter.
I've ruled on it, and I'll deny your motion to reconsider
because I think that's what it is.
MR. CALL:

I guess the concern that we would have, your

Honor, and if he could just as a procedural matter, if we
could just identify those issues, we could set it out in just
a very brief document so that it's in the record, so that
there isn't the assertion that we're trying to raise new
issues on appeal.
we like —

Because it didn't come into evidence here,

if we could just file that document.

But with

that said, we'll just do that to preserve the record and then
the Court can promptly deny it and —
already, but we'll just lodge that
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

—

I have no objection to your doing that.
—

filing that and then

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
THE COURT:

and it's denied

—

So I have to respond to it now?

If you want to respond, you can, but you

don't have to because I've already denied it.
MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

Thank you.
Now, the other thing is that

—

that leaves the issue as to damages relative to this property
that we're talking about.
MR. DEVASHRAYEE:

Well, no, your Honor.

Still —

we
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still have to —
THE COURT:

they to get worthy (Unintelligible).
ITm saying that, but what I'm saying is, to

me, you've got an issue that is subject to being settled
between the parties.
talking about now.

All right?

You know what you1re

And so my encouragement is that you get

together and see if you can resolve that issue.

If in fact

you can resolve that issue, we can enter a judgment, and we
could reserve the issue relative to this preemption issue if
you want to appeal that.
matter —

But it could resolve this other

you know, even looking at some of these things

we're talking about, the question becomes whether or not you
can really justify going ahead and expending more time on the
Really, itfs not a significant matter

question of damage.

unless somehow that preemption issue is found to be valid.
MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
THE COURT:

Yes.

That's what I —

we are in this matter.

that's where I really think

And so I would just ask you to look

at it from that perspective, see if you want to —

you can

come to a resolution of that damage issue, and even if

—

like I say, if you want to reserve for the purposes of appeal
the preemption issue, you can do that.
look at it from that perspective.
cutoff time like —

But I would like to set a

this has been languishing for a long

time, my fault, you fault, all of us.
resolved.

But you may wanna

We need to get this

And so what I will do, I'd like to give you some
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time to see if you can resolve it.
time to let you look at it?

Will 30 days be enough

We're into the holidays and I

know it's a difficult time, but Ifll give you what time you
need, but I just want to move it along and get it resolved.
MR. DEVASHRAYEE:

Could I have more time?

I

(Unintelligible) lot of time to dedicate to this issue for
the next 30 —

could we have 60 days?
It!s up to you two

THE COURT:
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

We ! d go even

—

—

We ! ve been going for 12 years.
What's a few more.

Havenft we?

Yeah, we'd go —

why

don ! t we go through the end of February.
THE COURT:

Could you get my —

Val, could you go get my

2006 calendar?
MR. CALL:

We would, your Honor —

in order to determine

the issue of value, we had previously talked about and had
requested copies of the records showing how much the property
had been sold for.

And the Court reserved on that.

Wanted

to determine if there was any property that lied outside of
the right of way.

In light of the fact that the parties have

stipulated that there is indeed property that's outside of
the right of way, we would like to receive copies of those
documents so we can see what this —

we believe it was an

arm's length transaction between the Railroad and the State
of Utah.

We'd like to see those documents

—
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THE COURT:
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:

Well
—

—

so we can see the values.

—

the only concern I have about that is

we're talking about such a small portion.
willing to let you look at that.

I'm not sure I'm

Mr. Devashrayee, what's the

position of the defendant in this matter?
MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
the first part of it.
THE COURT:

I'm didn't - - I ' m sorry, I didn't hear
What were you wanting?

They wanna know how much you paid for the

property.
MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
irrelevant.

I don't want (unintelligible) that's

I'm not gonna give you those documents.

THE COURT:
not right now.

It is —

you know, the issue is —

issue is

The issue is when this matter was filed in

1991.
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

Well, I would agree

—

We're talking about value.
I would agree with the issue of the value at

that time except that Mr. Weiser's still the owner of the
property that lies outside, and if there's been a purported
sale of that property today, that's still his property.

That

evidence would be relevant to damages.
THE COURT:
discovered.

At this point I will not allow it to be

All right?

Go from there, and if I think

there's some reason to look at it, I'll be glad to do that.
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But at this point, I111 deny that request.
Let's set a schedule.

And you are right, if it's a

continuing trespass, damage would be relevant, but at this
point, I'm gonna deny that request.
I'll give you —

if you want 60 days, what if I give you

until the 10th of February to see what you can work out on
the matter.

Is that enough time?

MR. CALL:

I believe we indicated if we could have

through the end of February.
THE COURT:

Do you want that —

set the schedule
MR. CALL:

—
The end of February's fine.

THE COURT:
right?

you know, I'll let you

—

as long as we've got a schedule, all

So we'll go —

I'll give you until the end of

February, which is the 28th, as a period of settlement.
have the issues remaining that have been indicated.

We

My

question would be, do you wish further evidentiary hearing on
those issues or do you consider them primarily to be ones
of —

of subject to briefing and maybe you could reach

stipulated facts?

It's up to you, I'll do it either way.

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:

Your Honor, I have already briefed

these issues in my brief (unintelligible) out.
brief of property regarding property
THE COURT:

It's called

—

I think we've briefed all the issues in this

case several times.
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MR. DEVASHRAYEE:

And if Steve wants to brief them

again, I guess we can, but I'm content for you just to rule
from the brief.
MR. CALL:

Yeah, I think that we have briefed the

issues.

Our claims are:

We claim for quiet title, an

issue —

and order for restitution as to that part of our

property that allows that —

lies outside, we've got a

forcible detainer claim, we have a treble damages claim, an
intentional trespass claim, a claim for unjust enrichment,
and a claim for punitive damages on that little parcel.
guess what we would anticipate would be giving —
evidentiary hearing.

So I

having an

We've already briefed out the liability

issues, and there's no dispute as to possession or the amount
of property that's outside, so we'd be talking just the
numbers with respect to those claims.
MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
hearing on —

Guess we could have an evidentiary

on those issues.

I mean I would present

evidence and am prepared to even at this hearing, although I
know that wasn't —

I didn't know how far the Court was gonna

go, but I was gonna show -- I have exhibits that were gonna
indicate no chain of our title to that property.
THE COURT:

This is from UDOT that you're claiming?

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:

Right, exactly.

Now, that's in the

form of an affidavit, so the evidence is in.

So I'm not

sure -- maybe just an ordinarily hearing without having to be
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evidentiary, that may be good enough.
THE COURT:

Well, I!11 tell you what I'm gonna do.

gonna continue it.

I'm

I'll give you until the end of February

to see what you can do about resolving it.

At that time, I

will get you two on a conference call and we'll set up a
schedule for how we're gonna handle the balance
MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:

—

Okay.

(Unintelligible)
—

of the case.

And between now and then

it'll give you a chance to sift through and see what you
really think's viable and maybe not so viable, and we can
boil it down to the issues that are really relevant before
us.
Let me indicate, when's the best time —

it's best for

me to make conference calls on Tuesday morning because I —
that's my civil law and motion calendar.

What I would

propose, that I call you two on February 28th in the morning
sometime and that we check the status on the matter.

If

you're able to resolve things before then and we need a
conference call or you wanna submit pleadings, you're welcome
to do that, but just so we stay on track.
conference call on the 28th of February.

We'll have a
What's the best

time of the day for you?
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:

Ten o'clock.
How about you, Mr. Devashrayee?

88

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
THE COURT:

We 1 11 call at ten ofclock on that date.

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
THE COURT:

Thatfs a Tuesday?

That's 28th of February, that's a Tuesday.

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
THE COURT:

That's fine.

Okay.

I would like, Mr. Call, for you to submit an

order in conjunction with today's hearing relative to the
stipulation and the agreement.
MR. CALL:

Okay.

THE COURT:

Also, you can include in that the motion

that youTve made for the Court to reconsider the —

the

preemption issue, and that I have denied that request.

Send

a copy of that to Mr. Devashrayee at least five days before
it's submitted to me for signature.
And just let me say to counsel, I have appreciated all
the work you've done on this trying to educate the Court.

It

seems to be a simple factual issue, but there are a lot of
facts that are of relative ancient origin that are important
in this matter.

And so I think that's one of the reasons I

think counsel have tried to resolve the matter to see if
something could be resolved that would be amenable to each of
the parties.

We're still trying to do that, but if we fail

in that, we'll get it resolved for you sometime in the
spring, so —
MR. CALL:

all right?
Thank you.

Hope Mr. Weiser's doing well

—
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THE COURT :
back

—

is able to be back with us, so -- see you

Make sure we got all your exhibits.

The ones I show I

have received, just for the purpose of the record, first of
all, as to those matters not included in the proffer, I have
rece ived Exhibi t 1, which was the Elliott survey .

If ve

I have received Exhibit 33, 34, and 36.

received Exhibi t 4.

I have rejected Exhibit 5, Exhibit 6, Exhibit 7, Exhibit 8,
Exhibit <3, Exhibit 12 and 13, Exhibit 19 and 20, and Exhibit
32.

But I will retain those in the file as being proffered

as e xhibits as part of the proffered testimony which has been
made a part of the record.
MR. CALL:

We also have that we had proffered Exhibit 2

and Exhibit 4 - THE COURT:
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

2 was rejected again.
—

as rejected exhibits and

—

Yes.
I believe you mentioned 2 and 4, but they

—

were also rejected.
THE COURT :

I do show 2 and 4.

I show 2.

4 was the

Loui s deed which was received -MR. CALL:
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

Okay.
—

in conjunction with the first testimony.

Okay.

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
(Unintelligible )

•

All with the limited admissibility
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THE COURT:

Yes, to the question of the centerline

1 issue.
MR. CALL:

And then the only other document is the one

that we'd like to mark: with Tacy that he's left with us.
THE COURT:

What exhibit is that?

That needs to be

1
1

marked -MR. CALL:
THE COURT:
narration on the
MR. CALL:

I guess we'll mark it as Exhibit 42.

1

Be Exhibit 42, and what is that, the
—
The delivery, and I do have a certification

from WashingtonL, D.C. —

the National Archives Records

Administration on that document.
THE COURT:
I can't -—

What is it?

I remember he read from it, but

how do you want to entitle it?

Is that the one
1

that talks about 18657
MS. PECK:
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:
an affidavit

It is, your Honor.
That will be Tomlinson.
George Tomlinson.

ItTs an affidavit —

it f s

—

MS. PECK:

1865 occupation.

MR. CALL:

Yeah, itfs an affidavit of Tomlinson.

THE COURT:

I'll make that part of the record as part of

the proffer, but agairL reject it as otherwise being
irrelevant.
MR. DEVASHRAYEE:

Steve, do you have that document?
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MR. CALL:

We

— this is the only copy that I h ave.

I

could give you -—
MR. DEVASHRAYEE:

Would you make me a copy and send it

to me?
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:

Sure.
Any other issues?

All right.

Will you take

your exhibits with you because we don1 t have a place to store
them, but

—

MR. CALL:
THE COURT:

We wi 11 take them.
All right.

Thank you , gentlemen.

I

appreciate your being able to resolve this matter today,
so

—
MR. CALL:

Thank you.

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
MS. PECK:
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

Thank you, your Honor.

Thank you, your Honor.
We'll talk to you in February.
Okay.

THE COURT : Let ]me just indicate, can we just excise -I mean copy those two pages and mark that as Exhibit —
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:

42.
42?

Is that okay?

That1 s -And then we'll make a copy for you, Mr.

Devashrayee, wh.Lie we 1 re doing that rather than
MR. DEVASHRAYEE:

Yes.

—

92

THE COURT:

—

the whole exhibit.

MR. DEVASHRAYEE:
THE COURT:

Is that agreeable?

Yes.

All right.
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CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
)
COUNTY OF WEBER)

SS

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING 92 PAGES OF
TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTE A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE
PROCEEDINGS TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY AS A
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH.
DATED AT OGDEN, UTAH THIS 8th DAY OF March, 2008.

DEAN OLSEN, CSR

TabC

[G-ENEBAJL NATURE—Uo. 2.J
AN ACT granting* to the Utah Central Railroad Company a right of way through the
public lands for the construction of a railroad and telegraph.

Be it enacted by tlie Senate arid Souse of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the right of way through
the public lands be, and the same is hereby, granted to the Utah Central Bailroad Company, a corporation created under the laws of the
legislative assembly of the Territory of Utah, its successors and assigns,
for the construction of a railroad and telegraph from a point at or near
Ogden City, in the Territory of Utah, to Salt Lake City, in said Territory.,- and the right, power, and authority is hereby givfcn to said
corporation to take from the public lands adjacent to the line of said
road material of earth, stone, timber, and so forth, for the construction
thereof! Said way is'granted to said railroad to the extent of two hundred feet in width on each side of said railroad where it may pass
through the public domain, including all necessary ground for stationbuildings, work-shops, depots, machine-shops, switches, side-tracks,
turn-tables, and water-stations: Provided, That within three months
from the passage of this act the said Utah Central Bailroad Company
shall file with the Secretary of the Interior a map to be approved by
him, exhibiting the line of the railroad of said company, as the same
has been located and constructed: Provided furtlier', That said company
shall not charge the Government higher rates than they do individuals
for like transportation and telegraphic service. And it shall be the duty
of the Utah Central Bailroad Company to permit any other railroad,
which has been of shall be authorized to be built by the United States,
or by the legislature of the Territory-of Utah, to form running connections with its road on fair and equitable terms.
SEC. 2. And be it furtlier enacted*, That the United States make the
grants herein, and that the said Utah Central Bailroad Company accepts
the same, upon the express condition that the said company shall not
exercise the power given by section ten of chapter sixteen of the laws
of the Territory of Utah, approved February nineteenth, eighteen hundred and sixty-nine; and upon the further express condition that if the
said company make any breach of the conditions hereof, then in such
case, at any time hereafter, the United* States, by its Congress, may do
any and all acts and things which may be needful and
necessary for the
enforcement of such conditions.
— : ~;"
SEC. 3. And be it furtlier enacted, That said Utah Central Bailroad shall
be a post route and a military road, subject to the use of the United
States for postal, military, naval, and all other Government service, and
also subject to such regulations as Congress may impose, restricting the
charges for such Government transportation.
SEC. L- And be it furtlier enacted*, That the acceptance of the terms,
conditions, and impositions of this act, by the said Utah Central Bailroad
Company, shall be signified in writing under the corporate seal of said
company, duly executed pursuant to the direction of its board of
directors first had'and obtained, which acceptance shall be made within
three months after the passage of this act, and shall be served on the
President of the United States; and if such acceptance and service shall
not be so made, this grant shall be void.
SEC. 5. And be it furtlier enacted, That Congress may at any time,
having due regard for the rights of said Utah Central Bailroad Company, add to, alter, amend, or repeal this act.
Approved, December 15,1870.
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DECLARATION OF INTENTION,
To Become a Citizen of the United States

I, George Tomlinson do declare, on oath, that it is bona fide my intention to become a
Citizen of the United States of America, and to renounce and abjure forever, all allegiance and
fidelity, to all and any Foreign Prince, Potentate, State and Sovereignty whatever, and
particularly to Victoria, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland of whom I was a subject.
Sworn and subscribed to before
me, at my office, at Salt Lake City, this
3 rd dayofMay,A.D. 1869.

)
)
)

Patrick Synch Clerk of the U.S. 3rd District Court, in and for the Territory
of Utah, do certify that the above is a true copy of the Original Declaration of Intention of
George Tomlinson to become a Citizen of the United States of America, remaining on record in
my office.

In Testimony Whereof, I have hereunto subscribed
my name and affixed the Seal of said Court, at my office in
Salt Lake City in said District this 3 rd day of May, A.D.
1869

Patrick Synch, Clerk
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DECLARATION OF INTENTION,
To Become a Citizen of -the United States.
£-#

-J.-

do declare, on oath,
that itis bona fide my intention to become a Citizen of the United
States of America, and to renounce and abjure forever, ail allegiance
and fidelity, to all and any Foreign Prince, Potentate, State aild
Sovereignty whatever, and particularly
to»^4^k^^^^^^^..^L^
Jptt^
I was a subject.
and subscribed to before ^
me, at my office, at#
SWOEK

.J L a ^

, A. D. 1802
*il<^5S!fc

%U£LJZ3ZZ^„

-Clerk of the U. 8,
„Court, in and for the Territory of Utah.

Clerk of the U 8.
c ^ b ^ ^ ^
Court, iiTand for the Territory of Utah, do
trug cp]
certify that the aljoye is a trug
cppy of the Original Declaration of
Intention o i L « ^ p ^
become a
"Citizen of the tTnited States of America, remaining on record in
my office*
IN TESTIMONY WHJSHEOF, I have hereunto subscribed my name, and affixed the
Seal of SAM Court, at my office, iiiwC£<s^<£~
in said^M.!^^^<^^^;.
thi&N^&^L.M.,.^—*.—day olL4dbuR2d£&MMM—,.

A. D. 186&1
Cfer^.
Jfawf Print

m
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I, Thomas Hancock, a citizen of the U.S. and of lawful age do solemnly swear that I am
well acquainted with George Tomlinson who is a naturalized citizen of the U.S. and the head of a
family consisting of a wife and 1 child and is an inhabitant of the NE of NW lA of Lots 2 and
West lA of NE quarter of Section No. fourteen (14) of Township No. one (1) North, of Range No.
one (1) west and that no other person resided upon the said land, entitled to the right of preemption; that the said George Tomlinson entered upon and made a settlement in person on the
said land since the first day of June, 1840, to wit: on the 17th day of April, 1871; and has erected
thereon a log house 14x16 feet with roof, floor, door and windows and is a comfortable house
to live in and has lived in the said house, and made it his exclusive home, from the 17th day of
April, 1871, till the present time; that he did not remove from his own land, within the State of
Utah, to make the settlement above referred to; and that he has, since said settlement, plowed,
fenced, and cultivated about 50 acres of said land and has thereon 115 rods fencing.
Thomas Hancock

I,
, Receiver do hereby certify that the above affidavit was taken and
subscribed before me, this 6 day of February, A.D. 1872.

, Receiver
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WE certify' that
subscribed to the foregoing affidavit,

. person

of respectability.
., Register,
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No. 742

Land Office at Salt Lake City, Utah February 6th, 1872

It is hereby certified, That, in pursuance of Law, George Tomlinson, Salt Lake County,
Territory of Utah on this day purchased of the Register of this Office, the Lot or West lA of North
East
North East of Northwest lA and lot 2 of Section No. fourteen in Township No. (1) one
North of Range No.
containing one hundred fifty and 50/100 acres, at the rate of two
dollars and fifty cents per acre, amounting to three hundred and seventy-six dollars and twentyfive cents for which the said George Tomlinson has made payment in full as required by law.
Now, therefore, be it known, That, on presentation of this
certificate to the COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE, the said George
Tomlinson shall be entitled to receive a Patent for the Lot above described.
, Register
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No. 742

Receiver's Office at Salt Lake City

Feb

1872

Received from George Tomlinson of Salt Lake County, Utah the sum of Three Hundred
and Seventy-Six dollars and Twenty-Five cents; being in Ml for the West lA of NE lA and North
East lA of North West lA and Lot Two (2) quarter of Section No. Fourteen in Township No. One
(1) North of Range No. One (1) West containing one hundred and fifty acres and fifty
hundredths, at $2. per acre.

$376.25

, Receiver
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PROOF OF RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION OF GEORGE TOMLINSON

I, George Tomlinson, claiming the right of pre-emption under the provisions of the act of
Congress entitled "An act to appropriate the proceeds of the public lands, and to grant preemption rights,'5 approved September 4, 1841, to the NE NW lA Lot 2 of Section number 14 of
Township number 1 North, or Range number 1 East, subject to sale at the Land Office at Salt
Lake City, do solemnly swear that I have never had the benefit of any right of pre-emption under
this act; that I am not the owner of three hundred and twenty acres of any land in any State or
Territory of the United States, nor have I settled upon and improved said land to sell the same on
speculation, but in good faith to appropriate it to my exclusive use or benefit; and that I have not,
directly or indirectly, made any agreement or contract, in any way or manner, with any person or
persons whatsoever, by which the title which I may acquire from the government of the United
States should inure, in whole or in part, to the benefit of any person except myself.
George X Tomlinson
I, Geo. R. Maxwell, Register, of the Land Office Salt Lake City, Utah, do hereby certify
that the above affidavit was taken and subscribed before me, this 6th day of July, A.D. 1872.
Geo. R. Maxwell, Register
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STEVEN W. CALL (A5260)
RAY, QU1NNEY & NEBEKER
36 South State Street, Ste. 1400
Salt LakeCity, Utah 84111
Tel. (801) 350-1500
Fax (801) 532-7543
ELIZABETH M. PECK (A6304)
LAW OFFICE OF ELIZABETH M. PECK
422 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Tel. (801) 521-0844

JN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GLEN C. WEISER, an individual,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 910749302

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,

Hon. Rodney S. Page

Defendant
Plaintiff Glen C. Weiser (the "Plaintiff')., by and through counsel, hereby gives NOTICE
OF APPEAL of the Second Judicial District Court's various Rulings, Orders and Judgments
made final by that certain Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment entered
herein on December 21,2007.
In addition, Plaintiff gives notice of appeal, inter alia, with regard to the following
rulings, orders and/or judgments:

1) The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment entered on
December 21,200 7
2) TMs Court's reconsideration of its grant of partial summary judgment to Plaintiff
upon [ 3 PR R 's ]\ lotion, and this Coi irt's October 19 2001 reversal,, of 1,1 s grant of partial
summary judgment to Plaintiff and award of partial summary judgment to UPRR on
the gioiiiick nl'.ww/v </i eisis diid Link ni Plainlilf s sliintiiiij.; 1i> challenge the
Conditional Grant;
3) This Court's rejection of Plaintiffs arguments that the Court should have analyzed
the issues in the case under the doctrines ofres judicata and collateral estoppel and
its determination that neither legal doctrine was binding in this case;
. -•

t's October !,.,, 2001 r ill i ng that the Condition a! Grant wa s \ al id , and that

pursuant to the Conditional Grant, a fee or limited fee interest in the subject property
was conveyed to U PKK and ibal Plaintiff Iwid no hinmimii); nitti'esl in the piopuly; in
so ruling, the Court concluded that UPRR owned the subject property and rejected
Plaintiff's argument that the Conditional Grant conveyed only a right-of-way to
UPRR's predecessor in interest.
5) Ilii s Coi irt's October 1, 2001 ruling which concluded that the subject property was
part of the "public lands" at the time the Conditional Grant was approved by

arguments and evidence that the property was taken out of the public lands by virtue
of Plaintiff s original predecessor'1 s homestea ci or pre-emption intere st in, the property.

6) This Court's conclusion and ruling that the Utah Fourth District Court's 1935 Decree
Quieting Title in favor of Plaintiff's predecessor was not dispositive or binding upon
this Court's determination that the subject property belongs to UPRR.

to another third party did not cause the property to revert to Plaintiff, nor was UPRR's
conveyance ul'iJic pinpLTly (o LIIJOIJICJ' conclusive (i\ idem c of its intent lo remise or
release its interest in the property. The Court ruled and ordered that UPRR's limited
fee interest did not revert back to the United States and then transfer forward to
Plaintiff, and in so ruling, the Court rejected Plaintiff's contention that if the
conveyance of the property was a limited fee conveyance, then it was subject to a
reverter to the I Jnited Stales and forward passage to Pla i ntiffthrou ghh is chain of
title.
8) This Court's December 21,2007 Order dismissing Plaintiff s claims with prejudice
for relief for quiet title, restitution, forcible detainer, treble damages, trespass and
unjust enrichment
9) The Court's ruling that the evidence and exhibits presented at trial by the plaintiff on
December 8,2005 that the subject property was not part of the public lands were
irrelevant and tin* ("'null's iilliinatt' conclusion urn! ruling at thai hem nig lhal flu:
plaintiffs property was part of the public lands at all relevant times.

10) The Court's ruling which precluded discovery as to the purchase of the subject
property which was sold by the defendant
11) The Court's rulings on the applicability of the pre-emption doctrine.
DATED this \& day of January, 2008.

RAY QUINNE \ As NEBEKER

f^i/i^,i^
Elizabeth M. Peck
('» ( nun H fin I'l unliff < il n WHscr

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify tiny oflS1'1 day ofjmiujiry. 'HMW. a tnio and torred. eopv of NOTICE OF
APPEAL was served byfirst-classmail, postage prepaid, to:

Jeffery J. Devashrayee
280 South 400 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Supreme Court of Utah.
Glen C. WEISER, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 950471.
Feb. 14, 1997.
Individual who claimed ownership of property on which railroad had built facility brought action to
quiet title. The Second District Court, Farmington Department, Rodney S. Page, J., entered partial
summary judgment in favor of individual, and certified judgment as final for purposes of appeal.
Railroad appealed, and the Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that matter involved only single claim,
even though multiple issues were involved, and thus could not be certified as final.
Appeal dismissed.

West Headnotes
[1J 13 KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote
0^106 Courts
€^1061 Nature, Extent, and Exercise of Jurisdiction in General
o»106k37 Waiver of Objections
ps-106k37(2) k. Time of Making Objection. Most Cited Cases
Lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at anytime by either party or by court.
[ 2 ] H KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote
o*30 Appeal and Error
c—30III Decisions Reviewable
<^ 30111(D) Finality of Determination
€^30k75 Final Judgments or Decrees
c^30k80 Determination of Controversy
o»30k80£(3} k. Determination of Part of Controversy. Most Cited Cases
0^30 Appeal and Error m KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote
€^30VII Transfer of Cause
c-30VII(B) Petition or Prayer, Allowance, and Certificate or Affidavit
c^30k366 k. Certificate as to Grounds. Most Cited Cases
Quiet title action in which grant of partial summary judgment was made involved only single claim
for relief, and thus, could not be certified for as final for purpose of appeal; while several issues were
presented by different legal theories asserted, only one claim existed, that of ownership of disputed
property. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 54(b).
*596 Steven W. Call, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Morris O. Haggerty, J. Clare Williams, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.

*597 HOWE, Justice:
Union Pacific Railroad Company appeals from a partial grant of summary judgment in this quiet
title action holding invalid Union Pacific's claim, under the Conditional Land Grant Act of 1870, to a
400-foot-wide right-of-way centered on its tracks in Davis County, Utah, which overlaps property
claimed by plaintiff Glen C. Weiser.
In 1873, Weiser's most remote predecessor in interest purportedly received title to the disputed
land through a federal land grant patent issued by President Ulysses S. Grant. In 1935, the district
court for Davis County quieted title to the disputed property in Roelof Steenblik, one of Weiser's
predecessors in interest. All known entities with a possible claim to the property were made parties to
that action. The Railroad was not made a party because there was no public record of its interest. The
Railroad did receive constructive notice by publication, however. In 1982, Union Pacific began
construction of a semi-truck loading facility on the disputed property. In 1987, Weiser discovered the
Railroad's use of the property and through counsel requested the Railroad to surrender and vacate
the property. The Railroad refused, and Weiser had Associated Title Company prepare a title report,
which showed that Weiser owned the property in fee simple. He again made a formal demand that
the Railroad surrender and vacate the property. Union Pacific again refused. Plaintiff brought this
action to gain possession of and to quiet title to the property. Union Pacific counterclaimed,
contending that the United States had granted its predecessor in interest, Utah Central Railroad, a
400-foot-wide "right-of-way through public lands for the construction of a railroad and telegraph" in
March of 1870. One of the conditions of the grant was that within three months after the passage of
the 1870 Act, the Railroad file with the Secretary of Interior a map approved by him "exhibiting the
line of said company, as the same has been located and constructed." The parties dispute whether
this condition was fulfilled. Weiser contends that because the Railroad did not timely file a certified
map that was accepted by the Secretary of Interior, the Railroad's grant of right-of-way fails.
£1] m After extensive research and historical analysis, the trial court granted a partial summary
judgment that the grant to the Railroad failed for lack of condition. The court certified its partial
summary judgment as final under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and explicitly "reserved for
further proceedings the parties' other claims in the case, including their claims of title based upon
other theories of law and/or equity." Weiser opposed the motion for certification and now argues that
this court lacks jurisdiction because "[t]he Partial Summary Judgment entered by the Trial Court is
not an order which can be certified final under Rule 54(b)." He offers no support for his contention.
However, "a lack of [subject matter] jurisdiction can be raised at any time by either party or by the
court." Olson v. Salt Lake City Sch. Distf 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986); see also Petersen v. Utah
Bd. of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Utah 1995).
£21 H In Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1991), we
reviewed the requirements for certification of a partial judgment as final. There, we reiterated our
holding in Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1984):
First, there must be multiple claims for relief or multiple parties to the action. Second, the
judgment appealed from must have been entered on an order that would have been appealable but
for the fact that other claims or parties remain in the action. Third, the trial court, in its discretion,
must make a determination that "there is no just reason for delay" of the appeal.
In the case before us, the trial court appears to have confused "claim" and "issue." Certification
requires different claims, not merely different issues. Here we have one claim-ownership of the
disputed land-supported by different legal theories.
The trial court stated that the issue of the validity of the land grant was a core dispositive issue,
because a decision in Union Pacific's favor would moot the other claims and render further
proceedings unnecessary. *598 Therefore, there was "no just reason to delay directing entry of final
judgment." While it may be true that if we were to find that Union Pacific prevails under the grant,
Weiser's other arguments would be irrelevant, the trial court failed to consider the opposite case.-—
If Union Pacific were to lose on appeal on the land-grant issue, it could pursue its claim under one of
the reserved theories of law and/or equity, resulting in a piecemeal appeal. We held in Bennion v.

Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137, 135 (Utah 1992), that "a claim is not separate if a decision on claims
remaining below would moot the issues on appeal." Here, a ruling that Union Pacific owns the
disputed land under, for example, adverse possession would moot the appeal now before us. Thus, to
hear this case in its present form would be to risk a waste of judicial resources.
FN1. This is rather surprising, considering that the trial court itself concluded that Union
Pacific did not prevail.

Apparently relying on our statement in Kennecott, 814 P.2d at 1103 (quoting Indiana Harbor Belt
R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 860 F_._2d 1441, 1445 (7th Cir.1988)), that the determination of the
separateness of a claim * 'focuses on the degree of factual overlap between the issue certified for
appeal and the issues remaining in the district court/ " the trial court stated that the judgment was
appropriate for certification because the underlying action involved "multiple claims for relief which do
not arise out of the same set of operative facts." It is true that the facts supporting ownership under
the land grant and under different theories of law and equity do not overlap. These separate facts,
however, all relate to the single land ownership claim. In sum, here there are neither multiple parties
nor multiple claims. Therefore, the partial summary judgment is not certifiable under rule 54(b), and
we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

ZIMMERMAN, C.J., STEWART, Associate C J . , and DURHAM and RUSSON, JJ., concur in Justice
HOWE's opinion.

Utah,1997.
Weiser v. Union Pacific R. Co.
932 P.2d 596, 310 Utah Adv. Rep. 14
END OF DOCUMENT
(C) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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